UNDERSTANDING ZIONISM

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الصهيونية والنازية وجهان لعملة واحدة

38 Years of Eviction from Palestine

ZIONISM AND NAZISM: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN

Towards A Deeper And More Accurate Understanding Of The Zionist Entity

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Credit to Comrade Nour for sharing this article

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Forty years since the founding of the Zionist entity.

Al-Hakim writes about Israel as a major regional state and the lessons/mistakes that came along with it.

As well as the process of confronting it.

Introduction

Forty years have passed since the establishment of the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine. Forty years. It is the age of the Palestinian diaspora and Arab Nakba. It is the age of uprooting, displacement, obliteration, dissipation, killing, and massacres to which our people were subjected to at the hands of Zionist gangs and the forces conspiring with them.

Forty years filled with resistance, confrontation, and the relentless struggle waged by the people of Palestine and the peoples of our Arab nation in order to preserve their personality and identity, and for the sake of winning their rights and recovering their usurped homeland.

In 1948, the Zionist gangs achieved what they wanted, and Herzl's ideas included in his book - *The State of the Jews* - were transformed into an actual state for the Jews on the land of Palestine. These armed gangs were given the utmost levels of imperial support in general, and the British in particular, to establish its state under the umbrella of international legitimacy embodied in [UN] Resolution Partition 181. These gangs may even go so far in translating this decision in a way that destroys the borders of the Palestinian state as drawn by the aforementioned resolution. It was only a few months ago until the conspiracy was completed in its chapters, with the Jericho Conference being held, and the Hashemite regime announcing the annexation of the remaining part of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. After that, for many years, the word Palestine was absent from the political and geographical dictionary in a fierce attempt to erase it from Palestinian memory.

If May 15, 1948 is suitable as an official date for the establishment of a state for the enemy, then the actual history of the emergence of this state goes back much further than that. This entity came as an extension of a comprehensive construction phase that lasted thirty years from the Balfour Declaration of 1917 until the Partition Resolution, during which the Jewish Agency played the role of a state within a state and exercised its powers on the broadest political, economic, military, and social scale. This stage - the

stage of the official declared adoption of the Zionist project by British imperialism - is an extension of twenty years of preparatory efforts that have taken on an organized and comprehensive character since the Basel Conference in Switzerland in 1897, which in turn came as a continuation and culmination of the movement for justice and dialogue that accompanied the emergence of Zionism since the middle of last century.

Perhaps this is precisely where the reason for the Israeli surprise in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 lies. Those who saw this war as a short excursion thought that they were facing a small group of outliers and were not sufficiently aware of the development of Israeli power in the various human, economic, armament, and military fields, which significantly outperformed the force. Arab countries entered the war not only on the qualitative-armament level, but also on the quantitative-human level. This was accompanied by the exacerbation of the impotence and betrayal of the Arab reactionaries and the widespread manifestations of backwardness and disintegration in the Arab situation. The 1948 war was between two parties: the first, the Israeli, which is living in its present and building its future at various degrees and levels, and the second, the Arab, emerging from the womb of the heavy Ottoman company, whose actual development was detained at the borders of the year 1918, due to imperial control, power sharing, and the division of the region between the main imperial cores at that time.

For all this, the defeat of 1948 represented a typical intersection of Zionist ambitions with colonial complicity, with the incompetence and betrayal of the Arab reactionaries. Based on this, it was self-evident that the call to recover Palestine intersects with the call to get rid of the reactionary and corrupt Arab regimes, with the call to be liberated from colonialism.

The imbalance that existed in the balance of power on the international scene at that time contributed to the success of the imperialist-Zionist effort to establish Israel. The Soviet Union, emerging from the war with its wounds, and with it the countries of the young socialist system, was not in a position to thwart this plan, not to mention the wrong estimates and

perceptions that were built. It has many positions towards the Zionist entity, whether related to the right of self-determination for the Jews or those related to the opportunities and possibilities for the democratic development of the young Hebrew state.

Many circles of world public opinion thought that Israel, the state of the Jewish victims who paid the most - in relative terms - the price for the rise of the Nazi monster in Europe - would be the gentle lamb - the oasis of democracy - in the region. The Western and Zionist media machine contributed to spreading this image and promoting it to be true. Remarkable successes that even global public opinion could not completely get rid of.

The Successes of the Zionist Entity

Forty years after the establishment of the Zionist entity, despite the serious and noticeable change in the image and status of Israel on the international scene, it took on the image of a fierce wolf. The one who shoots children, women, the elderly, and commits massacres, is gradually replacing the image of the gentle lamb always threatened by Arab barbarism and Palestinian terrorism.

Four decades have passed since the establishment of this entity, more than half of which occurred during the presence of the contemporary armed Palestinian revolution. During this period, six wars took place (1948 - 1956 - 1967 - 1973 - 1978 - 1982), in addition to skirmishes and limited military actions that did not stop throughout the period. The overall result of these four decades of conflict was ultimately in favor of the enemy.

During these years, the Zionist movement was able to achieve a number of things. The most important strategic objectives were:

A - Announcing the establishment of the state over an area wider than the boundaries of the Partition Resolution as a result.

B - For the 1948 war, expanding the borders of this state to an area larger than the borders of all of Palestine - including part of Syria and Egypt - as a result of the June 1967 War and the extension of its direct military influence into Lebanon as a result of the 1978-1982 wars.

C - Consolidating the internal structure of the state at the economic, social, and military levels, within the framework of a comprehensive strategic plan.

D - Increasing acceptance of it through a convergence of interests or a fait accompli, especially in the last ten years following the signing of the Camp David Accords.

E - Having the initiative through a clearly imbalanced balance of power in its favor.

The outcome of what the enemy state achieved during the past forty years has been conveyed. The result of what Israel has achieved from the circle of refuge, or the national homeland, to the ranks of the great regional state that emerges today as the greatest threat to the future, not only of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples, but also it threatens the limits of the vital field of Israeli power, the regional and international scopes.

For many considerations, the success achieved by the enemy is in reality much greater than it appears, for two basic considerations. The first is that the movement of the Palestinian-Arab team is in the [progressive] direction of history, while the march of the Zionist project is [in] the opposite. The second consideration is related to the amount of resources that the Arab team is supposed to have, which on the various levels, were incomparably greater than the resources [that were] available to the enemy.

However, the outcome of the conflict was in favor of the weaker team, in terms of its resources and the unity of its project with the movement of history, such that failure or success continued for all these long decades of time and with the magnitude that both failure and success were.

It can only be put in place by failure or strategic success. This bitter truth must not escape our attention at any moment. It is also not permissible to close our eyes to the facts and developments of the Arab-Zionist conflict under any excuse or pretext. No matter how difficult, harsh, and painful these facts are, the first condition for the success of the confrontation lies in an accurate, clear, and scientific understanding of the nature of the conflict, the current situation, the nature of the parties, their goals, and the objective and subjective conditions under which they operate and move.

We do not need to say or confirm here that the failure suffered by the Arab team in this conflict was never due to a weakness in the preparations of the masses and their pioneering forces to offer, sacrifice, and give. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the ill-fated fortieth anniversary of the establishment of Israel. These days pass in light of the intensification of the conflict between the Palestinian people and this is due to the cancerous

entity planted on the soil of their homeland. The blessed intifada in our homeland is entering its sixth month without interruption or interference in one of the most important, popular, and heroic confrontations that has few parallels.

It is enough for patriotic, progressive, and Arab nationalism to take a pause, review this long experience with itself, and search for the root of the error that caused this strategic failure which befell the Arab team. Because putting one's hand on the root of the problem is the correct beginning for any correct start. Away from any fear of practicing this comprehensive critical review. Away from the political reactions of the class and the convulsive learning that leads to running backwards and forwards, until the huge events and accumulated experiences become a reason for deep and systematic learning, and real benefit from the experience paid for in blood and huge sacrifices.

Israel waged its wars against the Arabs within the framework of a comprehensive strategy with clear objectives and features that drew its main lines and general principles more than nine decades ago. Within the framework of the same comprehensive strategy - Israel fought the battle of building the economic, social, scientific, and technological base, along with building an advanced military force that relies on the theory of the strong chain and not the central link. That theory stems from the fact that the strength of the chain is not greater than the strength of its weakest link. Therefore, work is being done to strengthen all links in the chain and not just be satisfied.

There is a strong central link and other weak links. Therefore, the concept of power according to this theory is nothing but a comprehensive expression of power in its economic, human, social, scientific, technological, and military meanings, which assumes various possibilities in the relationship with the imperial core and seeks to transform the borrowed power to self-strength. The hostile team, the Arab team, is supposed to make the best use of its existing, foreseeable, and potential resources, and it [is supposed to] act(s) according to this rule.

Perhaps here lies the reason for the enemy's success in reaching the shores of the great regional state, which is the modern expression of the biblical component of Greater Israel, and not in the conventional geographical sense - a meaning that has not been dropped from calculations of the comprehensive Zionist strategy - but in the modern, understood sense - power.

In contrast, what was the image of the Arab team that formed the other side of the equation of the conflict raging in the region since the beginning of this century?

The Failures of the Arab Team

We will not talk for long about the impotence and betrayal of the [Arab] reactionaries. The modern history of the region is full of black records, whose most prominent records are indicated only, starting with the reactionary position conspiring against the six-month strike in 1936, passing through the same position during the 1939 revolution, in addition to the impotent and exposed theatrical role in the 1948 war, and ending with the all known record after that date.

What I would like to point out in this article is exactly the position and strategic policy that the Arab nationalist team followed during these four decades of confrontation - Did this team have a comprehensive confrontation strategy with clear features and objectives to guide it and be guided by it?

The clear and definitive answer is, of course, no.

A lot could be said about the reasons for the absence of this comprehensive strategy and for acting under the illusion of the existence of such a strategy, but this is more dangerous. What must be emphasized is that the Arab national bourgeoisie, which has been at the forefront of the Arab National Liberation Movement since the beginning of the second half of this century, was not, by its backward and incompetent nature, able to formulate such a strategy. Nor were the alternative revolutionary forces, the class alternative for this leadership, in light of its continuing predicament to this day, were unable to formulate such a strategy. So how can we imagine the existence of a comprehensive joint confrontation strategy through which the various efforts and energies of the factions of the Arab National Liberation Movement are united and organized?

Even the Nasserist project, which no matter what was accepted or said about it, established the possibility for the first time for the Arab National Liberation Movement to seize the initiative in its own hands in the region. Even this project was not based on a comprehensive strategy, as

acknowledged by its leader and founder, the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In light of this fact, how can we imagine the possibility of the Arab team winning the outcome of this conflict? To the extent that it can be said that the confrontation project, whose opinions have been raised by many successive forces and factions over the past forty years, is serious. We raise these questions and inquiries, while in our minds that time is blood, and that we do not have the right to play the game of right and wrong.

We raise such questions and inquiries as an invitation to all our forces, factions, and intellectuals to give this vital and decisive issue the importance it deserves. These questions and inquiries are raised without the illusion that what we will present and provide a comprehensive and satisfactory answer, as much as it is a modest contribution to crystallizing the strategy of confrontation of the Zionist, reactionary, and imperialist attack.

As we have indicated, the correct starting point for the correct start is to know the nature of the enemy and who this enemy we are confronting is. What does he want and what does he have in terms of strengths and weaknesses? Where did we go wrong in the experience and where did we get right? And how do we then carry out the process of mobilizing, organizing, and deploying our resources and forces in this fierce battle?

How do we understand the Israeli enemy?

Understanding the Enemy

The starting point of any comprehensive strategy is embodied in knowing what the enemy is. You must understand our enemy in an accurate, clear, and scientific manner. I say a scientific understanding because many of the concepts we have about this entity are characterized by metaphysical and superficial preconceptions. Such as those that divide the world into two camps of absolute good and absolute evil, those that do not see the difference, diversity, or multiplicity of shades of color between them. Or those that never stop talking about the enemy's predicament, its times of crises, its confusion, and its uncertainty, which its owners suggest, intentionally or unintentionally, that the collapse of this enemy has become only a matter of time.

I say an accurate understanding because we are facing a changing and transforming entity. Therefore, it is not permissible for us to be satisfied with previous positions, nor is it permissible for our knowledge to stop there. Israel today is not the Israel of 1948. We must keep up with our knowledge of the movement of this entity and not make it our obsessions. Our obsessions are theoretical proof with which we twist the facts.

I say a clear understanding because we are not facing a problem limited to an enemy estimated at three millions Jews, more or less. This is because the root of the problem lies in the interconnection of this project - the enemy - with two central links that must be taken into consideration in any study or research.

The first is represented by the global Zionist movement, which provides this entity with copies of its life humanly, materially, and spiritually.

The second is the imperial core, without which we cannot understand the process of development and laws, nor can we fathom the strategic horizons that it supports. It goes without saying that the importance of these two episodes does not negate the importance of studying the subject in its connection with the movement and development of Arab reactionaries, which found in this entity the ideal tool to detain and obstruct

the development of the region, and a reliable means of preserving its survival and maintaining its power.

Thus, the importance of accurate, clear, and scientific knowledge for this entity appears as the first link in the process of formulating a comprehensive strategy for confrontation. The starting point for our attempt to present a realistic picture of this situation stems from: the acknowledgment - our acknowledgment - that the Israel of 1988 was completely defeated by the Israel of 1948 - neither by economic and social standards, nor by military-strategic standards, let alone the human standard.

During these four decades, a series of qualitative developments took place that placed this entity in the category of a major regional power, with all the changes that this entailed, not only at the internal - Israeli - level, but also at the level of its relations with the Zionist and imperial cores, and at the level of its view of the limits of the regional and international role assigned to it.

In order for the meaning of what we want to say to be clear, we will suffice here with a quick pause at the most prominent trends of this change in the position and role that has occurred to Israel, whether within its internal borders - the economic and social structure - or at the level of the foreign, policy, and the supreme strategy of this entity.

First: The reality of the economic conditions in the Zionist entity.

Before starting to monitor and analyze the most prominent economic indicators in Israel, it is worth pausing at the general strategic framework through which and within which a number of economic transformations took place in this entity. It is also worth pausing at the most prominent exceptional and auxiliary factors that made its economic growth and development proceed according to a graphic line that is unusual in the circumstances of the normal, natural development of any society.

Israel is a shifting entity, one that is rapidly transforming and changing according to the specific circumstances under which it lives and develops.

Therefore, the preconceived notions, the unseen notions, and the rigid hypostases with which this entity is viewed, are completely unsuitable for understanding its existing reality, and inevitably lead those who possess it to the most dire of consequences.

According to this view, it can be said that Israel has succeeded in reformulating its relations with the imperialist core on the basis of a partner tool instead of a hired tool. In light of this, it is no longer possible to talk about Israel as a burden, but rather as Israel, a strategic treasure and profitable partner for global imperialism.

The 1967 War, in particular, deepened this equation in the relationship between the Zionist project and the imperial project, as the former had a clearer and greater specificity within the framework of the latter. The war also brought about a serious change in Israel's view of itself and its role, which deepened after the 1973 war. This is what we sense in the speech of some Israeli strategic theorists who called for a security-strategic political design that involves great originality at the level of security theory and national supreme strategy, with the aim of granting a small and quantitatively weak state like Israel the power of a strong and large state, a situation that is not provided only by potential energy. The means of combat that Israel possesses are not only lethal, but rather a whole chain of which military capability is only one of the links. Therefore, a call was made to strengthen all links in the chain. The chain, as is known, is not stronger than its weak link.

What is essential, as stated above by some Israeli strategists, is that Israel is no longer the military institution that has a state. Rather, it is the state that has its military institutions, and if the latter is the strongest link, then it has become necessary to raise the level of the rest of the economic, social - and human - scientific links to the same degree of power. This equation is exactly what governed the economic programs of this entity, and from the perspective of this vision, dealings took place between the two imperialist and Zionist cores. Economic aid has become of strategic value. The importance and danger of military aid other than the stubborn relations

between countries of the imperialist camp and the underdeveloped peripheral countries - the Third World.

In light of this vision - the strategic plan, all natural, financial, human, economic, and marketing resources were employed to serve the project of the regional superpower. How was this done? What was the outcome of the past forty years?

The World’s Contributions to Israel

In the situation of Israel, it is not possible to ignore the decisive role that the outside world played in providing a decisive percentage of (1) human resources, specifically highly qualified ones, including (2) capital flowing without interruption, which led to a degree of capitalization that internal accumulation could not have provided at all. (3) Marketing facilities led to almost complete integration of Israel in the imperialist market. Under very appropriate conditions, it led to the assertion that Israel was dealt with as one of the countries of the imperial core and not one of the countries of the periphery.

These facts are indisputable. But what has not been given the attention or effects it deserves and still causes some confusion among many concerned circles is how these resources were used and how Israel employed this aid in serving its own project that is linked and parallel to the general imperialist project.

First: Financial Resources

During the years extending from 1950-1984, enormous financial resources flowed into Israel, estimated at approximately 92 billion dollars according to 1980 prices, more than two-thirds of which came from the United States, followed by Federal [Republic of] Germany, and the international Zionist movement, as well as aid, loans, and other donations from various imperialist countries.

During the same period, 96 billion dollars at 1980 prices were also allocated for investment at home, which indicates that financial transfers from abroad did not go to consumption or non-productive areas, but rather to capital formation. This number is equivalent to a quarter of Israel's GDP, which is one of the highest percentages in the world.

Thus we reach an important conclusion that the high burden of security on Israel did not prevent it from building an advanced economic base to which a quarter of its GDP has been allocated. Going more into the details of

spending these huge amounts of money, we note that Israel did not receive 64 billion dollars, or about two-thirds of the total capital formation, having been invested in fields of a similar nature.

Production (construction, tools, machinery, etc.) while the share of the family sector - individuals' holdings of durable goods and buildings - did not rise above one third of the total capital formation. This resulted in an increase in the degree of capitalization in various productive sectors.

In agriculture, for example, the share of irrigated land increased from 18% in 1949 to about 50% in 1984. Mechanization advanced during this period, so the number of agricultural machines increased from 1.3 thousand machines in 1949 to 29.9 thousand machines in 1984. The personal consumption of water per Israeli individual rose to 260 liters per day, [whereas it was] 60 liters for a Palestinian citizen in the West Bank.

In the electricity sector: the output increased from 464 million kilowatts in 1950 to 12.9 billion kilowatts in 1984, more than a third of which went to the industrial sector, and nuclear technology entered this field from its widest gates, whether in generating electricity or desalinating water.

In the industrial sector, during the years 1950-1984, 15 billion dollars was invested. Of these, approximately 11 billion shares of modern technological machines. Thus the share of this sector increased from 13% of the total capital formation in the 1960s, to 15% in the 1970s, and to 21.3% in the 1980s.

The concentration of investment in this sector has reached an important record level. For every single industrial worker, there are industrial investments estimated at about 50 thousand dollars on average, this being a very high percentage.

Second: Human Resources and Qualified Labor Force(s) in the Israeli Economy

In parallel with the intense capitalization witnessed by the Israeli economy, the labor force available to this economy was employed with the maximum

efficiency, both for new immigrants and those who were predominantly of advanced educational qualifications. Or with regard to using science to raise the level of qualification of resident workers, or by creating new fields and opening new doors to benefit from women's work on a large scale, and finally by employing cheap, unqualified Arab labor to do work.

The third - which the Israeli worker grows above doing, and grows towards working in fields that require competence and specialization.

During the period from 1948-1984, the number of immigrants to Israel reached one million and three quarters of a million immigrants, of whom one million and 400 thousand people settled in Palestine. The percentage of those who were of working age and highly qualified ranged between 25 - 31% during the years 1974-1984.

In light of the available information about the composition of migration, we can say that between 49 thousand and 65 thousand highly qualified people arrived in Israel during the period from 1955-1984. Among them were between 18 to 26 thousand engineers and between 10 thousand and 8 to 13 thousand doctors.

The period between 1972-1984 witnessed the largest influx of highly qualified immigrants. While the total number of immigrants during these years amounted to 35% of the total immigrants between 1955-1984, the percentage of doctors and engineers was about 70% of the total number of doctors and engineers who flowed to Israel during the years 1955-1984.

These numbers simply mean a complete and free revolution in the composition of the Israeli labor force. It has had and will have the greatest impact on formulating the Israeli vision, whether in the field of economics or in the field of higher strategy.

In addition, educational institutions within Israel were subject to continuous development and expansion. It produces thousands of graduates annually, and this can be inferred from the average years of schooling among individuals over the age of 14 years. While the percentage of those with 16

or more years of schooling out of the total population over the age of 14 years was 3.6% in 1961, it rose in 1970 to 4.1%, in 1975 to 7%, in 1980 to 8.5%, then to 9.8% in 1984, meaning that the increase reached nearly three times the amount of scientific wealth as well, at a minimum.

Among the most important results that scientific development has led to is the internal structure.

On the other hand, the percentage of the labor force saw an increase among these people, reaching 37% of the total Jewish population (22% of Palestine in 1948), which is a high percentage in which the widespread employment of Israeli women plays an important impact. It reached 67.5 women for every hundred men in 1984, while in 1972 it was 52 women for every hundred men, while the ratio among Arab women in 1984 was 17.5 Arab women for every hundred [male] Arab workers.

The most important indication of development in the Jewish women's employment rate is the transition of 112.2 thousand people from the position of unproductive consumers to the position of producers, thanks to the increase in the percentage of women's contribution to work. This in itself constitutes a significant compensation for the unproductive labor force, especially in the security sector. This number is also close to the volume of Arab labor imported from the occupied territories in 1967, whose number in 1984 reached 125 thousand wage workers. Their work in Israel provides the opportunity for the Israeli plan to redistribute Israeli human energy to the various economic branches and direct them towards the highest levels of production, while absorbing Arab workers at the bottom of the production ladder. Thus, it becomes clear to us that Israel not only enjoyed the highly qualified human resources whose influx from abroad constituted a revolution in the composition of Israeli labor, but also worked to provide the maximum investment conditions for the labor force at home, as it worked to raise its level of qualification, increase women's contribution to it, and benefit from the opportunity provided by Arab workers flowing from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Third: Marketing Facilities for the Israeli Economy

If Israel has succeeded in ensuring the flow of financial and human resources and in employing and investing them according to a scientific plan that keeps in mind the highest strategic goals of this entity, then how did Israel succeed in solving the market problem? In answering, we can note three methods in which Israel dealt with the problem:

The first method: expanding the internal market through population growth - natural on the one hand and resulting from the influx of immigrants on the other hand. In addition to raising the degree of capitalization and the level of employment, which in turn contributed to raising the demand for goods and services and led to the activation of the economic cycle.

Israel was saved by an established method. It was the practice of an inflationary policy aimed at changing one pattern of social behavior, namely the tendency to hoarding, in favor of another pattern, which is spending incomes and converting them into fixed goods. Israel has fought the effect of deflation - with inflationary policy, a method known in capitalist economics.

The second method: expanding the market in a colonial manner through occupation, as it became known that Israel was facing its first and most serious structural economic crisis - the crisis of overproduction - on the eve of the 1967 War, following the completion of the comprehensive industrialization program that was implemented with German reparations funds.

The market of the occupied territories in 1967, with its resources and consumer capacity, constitutes between a quarter and a third of the Israeli market itself. It is a guaranteed market - because it is almost a monopoly for Israel. It dominates 90% of the imports of the occupied territories, and Israel's total exports amounted to 637.5 million dollars in 1984, while in 1968 they were 509 million dollars.

The deficit in the trade balance between Israel and the occupied territories developed from 36.7 million dollars in 1968 to a surplus of 442.1 million dollars in the trade balance in favor of Israel in 1948. This surplus covered 17.5% of the total deficit in the Israeli trade balance in 1984.

The occupied territories in 1967 are considered the largest single importer from Israel after the United States. Their economic weight in this sense can be compared to the major blocs in the world, as they absorbed 33% and 39% of what the European Common Market and the United States absorbed, respectively, of Israeli exports in 1984.

The third method: integration into the imperialist market. Israel succeeded in entering the international market through the most appropriate conditions and facilities for its economy, and in a gradual manner that was consistent with the scale of development that it achieved, changing the Israeli economic structure.

As a result of these exceptional facilities that Israel obtained from countries, imperialism was treated as a central state. The Israeli economy has achieved additional leaps.

Israeli exports to European market countries increased between 1974 and 1984 from 298 million dollars to 8,903 million dollars, that is, by 170%, while Israeli imports from the market only increased by 73%.

As for the facilities provided by the United States, they contributed to an increase in Israeli exports to the American market between 1974 and 1984 by 445%, while Israel's imports from the American market during the same period did not increase by more than 135% only.

With a simple calculation, it becomes clear that the practical results of the agreements between Israel and the imperialist countries were an additional increase in Israeli exports amounting to 1 billion, 614 million dollars, of which an additional 937 million dollars were due to American facilities, and 682 million dollars were due to European facilities. This total additional figure equals to a quarter of Israeli exports to all parts of the world.

Moreover, the aforementioned amount is equal to 25.3% of the total amount absorbed by the occupied territories in 1967 from Israeli exports. In other words, it was for both Israel's agreement with the European Common Market and the United States, [signifying] the importance that the 1967 War had on Israeli exports.

In light of the above, we conclude by saying that Israel has been able, over the past decades, to exploit to the maximum extent the torrent of financial and human resources flowing to it from abroad, to also benefit to the maximum extent from the marketing facilities available to it, to reformulate accordingly, and within the framework of its own perspective, its supreme strategy. Not only in the military context, but also in the comprehensive framework that is understood as power, with its economy, technology, science, and so on.

This new formulation has led to a reconsideration of the priorities and preferences of internal economic construction, where industry occupies a leading position, and where the electrical and electronic industries occupy an increasingly important place in total industrial production (1,702 in 1982 instead of 43 in 1965).

As the labor force is heading towards extreme concentration, 1.5% of industrial establishments employ 45.3% of the industrial labor force, and as Israel has succeeded in raising labor productivity per worker at fixed prices three and a half times during the years 1950-1984.

All of this will have the greatest impact in representing the market problem once again to the Israeli economy, which has nearly exhausted the marketing opportunities available to it. This leads to the belief that Israel will storm the doors of normalization with its Arab surroundings, through peace, war, or both.

Are we exaggerating anything if we then say that the strong chain theory has actually come into effect in Israel after we saw the extent of modernization and development that affected the economic structure?

Is there any doubt in any of us that the enemy’s concept of force was transcended a long time ago? Is its military scope included in the broader economic, social, scientific, and technological scope?

Will we enter into our higher strategic calculations, whether we adopt the line of long-term people's war? The strategic balance line takes these facts into consideration. Or do we remain prisoners of preconceived notions about this enemy?

Any comprehensive and careful reading of the significance of the numbers mentioned about the reality of the economic situation in Israel leads to the necessity of deep thinking about this enemy and deep thinking of our strategy for a comprehensive confrontation of its plans and higher strategy.

Contradictions Within Israeli Society

Second: Social transformations and their impact on the contradictions of society.

Since Israel was the product of a Zionist-imperial project that has existed historically for more than a century, and has had a clear-cut strategic vision since its early years. Since Israel had been granted, since the first years of its founding, the position of a state of the most favored by imperialist circles, whether through military support or economic aid, and later marketing facilities. Since this entity also seized from the first moment, the land, homes, possessions, and the accumulations achieved by the Palestinians in their homeland. For all of this, the enemy state has found additional weapons to confront the internal social problems it has faced over the past forty years.

This entity was destined to possess the power of economic-financial power with multiple internal and external sources, to the extent that it was able, and still is able to confront the social problems that stand in its way, and to provide solutions to them in a way that does not stop at the limits of preventing their aggravation, but rather tends towards alleviating the severity of their impact as well.

It was natural for the Zionist movement and international imperialism to do everything in their power to entice new groups of immigrants to come to our country, and to provide them with the most comfortable and suitable alternative to their original homeland. Therefore, the supreme strategy of this entity required not to allow social problems to escalate. Rather, providing conditions for a standard of living for the Jewish population that matches its European counterpart on average - and is significantly higher than what is the case in the Arab neighborhood.

The matter did not stop only at the occurrence of offering the temptation to immigrate only - this is a crucial, ideological, and political basis for Zionism - rather, the matters became, even before the establishment of Israel, the solution to any social problems, including the disintegration of the Zionist

institution. The Jewish Agency first - then the emerging state on our land later.

The Zionist institution had several factors since its beginning that have contributed greatly to maintaining its cohesion.

The first: A historical factor, in terms of the length of time between the beginning of the immigration flow and the announcement of the establishment of the state, which is no less than forty years, thirty years of which were under the British Mandate, which sponsored and facilitated the task of assimilation on the largest scale.

The second: The institutional framework through which immigration was carried out. The World Zionist Organization held its first conference in Basel, Switzerland, after 35 years of preliminary work, with all its arms, institutions, and organizations that played their role in reformulating Jewish consciousness and directing it, according to its strategic plan in its various stages.

The third: The political framework that gave the institutional framework a high level of care and facilities. By the political framework we mean the Mandate Instrument, which made one of the first tasks of the Mandatory government to sponsor the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in accordance with the Balfour Declaration, which resulted in the Jewish Agency assuming the role of the state within the state, through its bodies and institutions. The work of the Zionists in our country has become an act of the state and not an act of individuals and bodies.

The fourth: The quality of immigrants and their distribution in different regions. It is true that immigrants came from four corners of the earth, but 66% of them before 1948 came from only four countries. Poland alone had about 35% of the total immigrants before 1948. This means that we were dealing with large, homogenous blocs of migrants. All of these factors made the Zionist entity rely on a system of political, economic, social, military and religious structures, and institutions that were formed before its establishment and crystallized after it. They were the basis for playing a

decisive role in absorbing immigrants and downplaying their distinction and the differences in their projects and cultures.

After the establishment of the entity, the Palestinian land was made available to the enemy with what was on it, a wealth whose value is impossible to estimate. Then came a flood of financial aid from abroad, which was estimated until 1982 at about 92 billion dollars, to do its job in alleviating the severity of society's conflicts and contradictions.

All of this was employed within the framework of an integrated strategic plan that ultimately led to the crystallization of the Israeli social option, by which we mean the adoption of a social policy that does not allow the exacerbation of social tensions, prevents them from erupting, maintains the level of a high living standard for the general population, reducing the size of the social gap between different segments of society, and not allowing the state to be transformed into a distinct minority state.

Here we can mention a group of factors that combined to make this social choice for the enemy state.

First: The maturity of the party and political institution, and its precise knowledge of what it wants to achieve.

Second: The motives driving the thinking of the political elite in this field; ideology had a decisive and critical role.

Third: The existence of a sufficient distance between the state and the political elite, and thus the higher interest of the Zionist project on the one hand, and the traditional financial and social pressure cores on the other hand.

Fourth: The nature of the political system, specifically the electoral system, which allowed all contradictions to express themselves and thus exert their influence within the limits determined by their size and electoral transfer.

Fifth: European values are rooted scientifically and socially.

Sixth: The Zionist project as an open possibility towards expansion and its entrenchment in the programs of the Zionist parties, which imposed a self-development of capabilities.

Seventh: The Zionist project is based on the principle of aggression that has actually been achieved or is to be achieved.

Eighth: The importance of immigration as a decisive factor that dictates the necessity of presenting a model of assimilation that will entice more immigrants to come.

Ninth: The risks of counter-migration, which increase according to the increase in various pressures on this or that segment of the population.

Tenth: The dangers of raising the degree of internal contradictions in light of the high degree of contradiction with the outside.

All of these factors contributed to shaping the social choice of the enemy state, and all of them accelerated the ability of this entity to mitigate the severity of its internal problems and prevent them from reaching the point of explosion.

The enemy state sought to propose different solutions to these problems, linking security and future solutions. Compulsory conscription, for example, was not only a means of meeting specific security needs, but also an effective means of creating harmony and unity.

The priorities of economic development at every stage of the development of this good entity were subject to the integrated strategic plan, which leaves no room for a weak link that could break the entire chain.

Military, educational, religious, media, and educational institutions were mobilized for this purpose, and the educational institution among them all had a notable and distinctive role.

We have noticed, as we mentioned previously, how the enemy has achieved remarkable progress in building a qualified labor force, raising the rate of

higher education, and increasing the rate of women's contribution to work and the rate of employment. The matter, as a whole, led to an increase in the standard of living of the Zionist settlers, whose significance we must realize.

It may be said that the credit for this high standard of living is due to the direct plunder practiced by the colonialists against our people and our homeland. Given the exorbitant wages they receive in exchange for playing an imperial role in the region, this statement is true, but it is also true that the use of these exceptional external incomes has been subject to a planned and conscious strategy, with which the Israeli interior now has an important and major role in the production of wealth, and with it social problems have become less aggravated.

This, of course, does not mean that the Zionist enemy has succeeded in eliminating social differences between the various segments of its population. This task is impossible in a capitalist society, and it is not required within the framework of the Zionist strategic plan, which reserves for the private sector a special and important role.

But the thing that must be noted is that the severity of the social problems facing this entity is not exacerbated to the extent that the Arab media sometimes portrays it intentionally or unintentionally, and this is what is most important, it will not reach the point of exacerbation on its own or as a result of its spontaneous development, but rather it will exacerbate it. It seems conditional on the growth of the role played by the Palestinian and Arab national and progressive forces in destabilizing this entity.

For example, there was a lot of talk about the problem of the Eastern Jews in the Zionist entity. Although they actually occupy the third place in the Israeli social ladder after those born in Palestine and Western Jews, but the Dome, as the data indicate, the statistics are shrinking. This may not satisfy our desires and dreams about the problems of this entity erupting, but desire and dream are one thing, and objective reality is another.

Let us take, for example, the educational level. We notice that the percentage of Western Jews who completed 16 years of schooling in 1984 was 14.5%, while it was 3.6% among Eastern Jews. Here is an important difference. But it is noticeable that the rate of increase of these between the years 1974-1984 among Western Jews was about 45%, while the percentage among Eastern Jews reached 90%, and instead of the gap being 1-3%, as was the case in 1974, it became 4% in 1984, which makes us think about the situation at the end of the 1980s, or perhaps at the end of this century, how the picture will be further aggravation or further rapprochement at the social level.

Let us take another example. Women going out to work among Western Jews was the situation in 1966-84 - one working woman for every hundred working men, and among Eastern Jews it was this percentage. This difference is also large, but the increase in women's contribution to work among Western Jews increased by 34% during the years 1974-1984 and among Eastern Jews by 43.6%. So what can we imagine the situation will be at the end of this century?

These are some indicators, and there are many others, which force us not to be reassured, to rely on the worsening of this entity's internal problems - and so on - and to be uncomfortable with uncritically using phrases of crisis and impasse to describe the situation of this entity. Because that would stray away from seeing the truth as it is, and here we have fallen into a serious and grave mistake.

We must also acknowledge that the enemy succeeded in raising the standard of living of its settlers for the reasons we mentioned. The percentage of families residing at a rate of two or more people in one room decreased from 56% in 1957 to 9.6% in 1984.

The percentage of families residing at a rate of one person or less per room increased to 57% until the year 1984. This is also one of many standards that cannot be mentioned, whether in terms of family ownership of durable

goods, or private cars; the ownership of which rose from 43% of families in 1960, to 53% of families that owned their own cars in 1984.

To avoid the problem of lack of justice in distributing income Israel resorts to two means.

Two means: The first is to impose a progressive tax system that reaches 100% on some high incomes.

The second is to exempt productive goods from taxes to encourage and stimulate the private sector to invest in order to contribute to the required development of means of production. For this reason, it was possible to control exaggerated deviations from the line of justice in distributing income in accordance with the requirements of higher policy and the higher interest of the Zionist project.

The only ones who constituted an exception to this rule were the Arabs who had suffered under the Zionist occupation since 1948. Despite their integration into the economic cycle of this entity, they ranked fifth at the bottom of the social ladder of the Zionist entity, after the African Jews, who ranked fourth after the Eastern Jews.

A simple comparison between the conditions of the Arabs and the conditions of the Eastern Jews becomes clear; the extent of the thousands and persecution they were subjected to as a result of the racist policy of the Zionist entity. With regard to housing, for example: the density per room for African Jews is 29%, while for Arabs it is 2.12%. The percentage of Arab families in which three or more people live in one room is 36.4%, while this percentage for African Jews does not reach 8%.

Regarding durable goods, the percentage of Arab families that own a television set does not exceed 67.5, according to statistics in 1981.

While the percentage of Arab women working in 1984 was 17.5% of the number of male workers, the percentage among African Jews was 84.4%.

These numbers are valid. An example of the thousands of years of injustice and persecution that have fallen upon our citizens under occupation compared to even the lowest groups on the Jewish social ladder, which reveals the hateful, racist nature of Israeli policy within the so-called Green Belt.

In short, we can say that the enemy has had additional sources of income, which has increased the size of the wealth being distributed, which has also enabled it to reconcile its security and development needs without disturbing the settlers' standard of living. This situation is sideways.

The various Jewish groups were prevented from falling under effective social pressure. On the contrary, social conditions improved continuously and to a high degree, aided by the abundance of resources from abroad and the rise in labor productivity at home. These resources, the distribution of which was linked to a strictly implemented tax policy aimed at narrowing social gaps on the one hand, and on the other hand, preserving the position occupied by the private sector within laws that preserve the productive nature of the wealth and profits belonging to this sector, which operates within the interests of the state, and not the other way around.

These are the most prominent features of the social policy of the Zionist entity, and the most prominent transformations that have occurred in this field. As is evident here once again, the highest Zionist strategic goals stand out as the organizer, driver, and axis of social policy, which must be studied with a special degree of care and attention.

Israel’s Strategy and Military Capabilities

Third: The development of Israel’s strategic thought and military capabilities.

As in the economic and social field, the field of strategic thinking and Israel's military capabilities has witnessed remarkable change and development over the past forty years. It has become necessary to look at these developments comprehensively, not just regurgitating old knowledge and analyses, but rather getting into the heart of these transformations, evaluating them, and formulating a counter-confrontation strategy based on science and facts, not on dreams and perceptions.

Perhaps the major turning point that marked a complete turnaround in Israeli strategic thinking was the results of the 1973 war, until it seemed to Israel that the facts of the June 1967 War, and the resulting cheap, crushing victory for its army over the Arab armies, were no longer valid after 1973, and that the size of the gap in the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel was able to be reduced in a few years, enabling the Arabs to employ the tendency effectively, making the risk of an imbalance of power in favor of the Arabs becoming a real and possible matter unless a broad adjustment is made in the Israeli strategy.

Therefore, the goal of this Israeli strategy after the 1973 war was not only to maintain the balance of power that leaned in favor of the enemy, but also to expand it and work to create a technological and time difference that is difficult for the Arabs to overcome within a limited number of years.

With this change that occurred in the enemy’s strategic thinking, a similar change occurred in Israel’s concepts regarding the balance of power, the enemy, and the components of power. It is a change that can be said to have had no roots cut off from the essence of the higher strategy under which the Zionist project in Palestine arose and worked to bring it into effect.

For Israel, national security is an expression synonymous with existence itself. Therefore, the enemy must be looked at with a new eye, not only the

existing enemy, but also the potential enemy for patriotic, national, religious, ideological, and scientific reasons. When calculating the balance of power, this fact must be taken into consideration, and the human, technological, and other elements must be calculated in light of that.

Accordingly, it is not possible to look at the components of power from a one-sided perspective that reduces the psychological aspect to the economic, human and security aspects.

In light of this view, action has taken place over the past years, as the scope of the Israeli force's action extended to areas far from the Arab-Israeli contact line. Today, we hear about ideas and projects that go as far as striking the nuclear reactor in Pakistan for fear that it will turn into producing an atomic bomb, which may threaten the security of this entity in different political circumstances.

In light of this strategy, important transformations took place in the structure of the Israeli military institution, accompanied by more comprehensive transformations in the economic structure, specifically those related to it. In the military industry, we will limit ourselves here to pointing out some aspects of the enemy’s strategic thinking, which was reflected in its military capabilities.

First: In the human field, where one of the most important lessons of the October War was learned, which was the necessity of increasing the human capacity of the Israeli military establishment, so the number of Israeli soldiers, whether conscripts or reserves, was increased, so that Israel became able to mobilize quantitatively in the battlefield at a rate not much less than its capacity. The Arab armies are accordingly - the number of the Israeli army is approximately a quarter of a million professional soldiers, excluding reserves.

The most important and dangerous thing in this matter is that the increase in the human capacity of the Israeli military institution was not at the expense of the human capacity employed in the civilian sector, but rather

this was compensated for by increasing the employment rate, not to mention the continued cessation of immigration and Arab labor.

There has also been a significant change in the qualitative level of human energy working in the security sector and the army in light of a trend towards introducing more weapons and advanced technological party equipment, and in light of the widespread use of electrons in the weapons used in the Israeli army.

Second: It is used in the armament field, as reliance has remained on external sources of weapons at a time when the Israeli army began to absorb more and more advanced weapons manufactured internally. After all, the Israeli military industry has come a long way in providing the army with its needs of ammunition and many types of weapons and in introducing the required modifications to imported and old weapons, to suit the modern level of rapid technological development, and to suit the nature of the conditions in which these weapons are used.

The most important factor, as the enemy leaders in this field point out, was, is and will continue to limit the strength of the Israeli army, is the factor of means of combat and not the human factor. That is, Israel must make its army a growing force by improving the level of its means of combat and not just by increasing its human capacity.

All of this is taking place within the framework of a strategy aimed at transforming borrowed power into internal power.

The most dangerous thing that Israel has done in this area is its expansion of the use of the electronic dimension in weapons, whether in terms of identifying targets or hitting them accurately - smart munitions - or in terms of making the most of the aforementioned dimension in managing security work, leadership, control, communication and intelligence. This dimension is Israel's top priority and its first condition for achieving its strategic qualitative superiority.

Third: The military industry within the framework of the strategy of transforming from borrowed power to self-power. Since the beginning of the 1930s, Israel has worked to establish a military industry, and this industry has come a decisive step in development. The Israeli military industry falls within the framework of a comprehensive infrastructure aimed at strengthening the enemy's power components.

A lot may be said about the size of the military product manufactured inside Israel, but the most important thing is that Israel has entered the age of technetrons in light of the revolution of controlled ammunition and the apparatus of control, guidance, communication and intelligence.

Although the information in this regard is limited, and it is considered one of the state's top secrets, it is inferred from more than one indicator about the advanced level achieved by the enemy on this level.

Perhaps the most prominent of these indicators is the rise in the share of electronics in total industrial production, or in Israeli exports abroad, not to mention the miscellaneous information provided by officials in this regard.

Israel has carried out a number of military operations that reflect the level it has reached in this regard. It remains to point out that while the economy plays a decisive role in raising Israel's strategic capacity, the Israeli military industry in turn contributes to reviving the economic cycle of this entity, as Israel's military exports play an important role in this regard, as the military industry absorbs a significant proportion of labor capacity in Israel.

Fourth: The nuclear capability of the Israeli enemy, as the enemy's nuclear option is as long as the lifespan of this entity itself, culminating in 1963 with the construction of the Dimona reactor. Although Israel talks about the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it is actually used for peaceful purposes - electricity and water desalination - the main goal of the option was and still is to enter the stage of nuclear terror by producing weapons of mass destruction. Information has recently been revealed about the Israeli nuclear arsenal, the least of which is pessimistic. It indicates the presence of 200 atomic bombs the size of the Hiroshima bomb, along with means of

transporting them, represented by the Jericho-2 missile, which is a modified version of the Pershing-2 missile. Its range of operation extends to the south of the Soviet Union.

In light of the above, we can say that Israel is in a race on two levels: the first is the level of nuclear technology and the second is the level of conventional weapons, on both the quantitative and qualitative levels. All indicators indicate that Israel has absolute dominance at the first level, while at the second level - conventional weapons - as well. In a way, there is no indication that Israel is entering into an uncomfortable race, so far.

Looking at the enemy's military capability and knowing the horizons of his strategic thinking is necessary if we are thinking in terms of a people's war or in the logic of strategic balance. This is to avoid the mistake of underestimating the capabilities of this enemy and the risks resulting from its threats to the national security of the peoples and countries of the region, or the mistake that seeks to portray this enemy with the appearance of an invincible and supernatural ability in an attempt to justify impotence, surrender, and falling into the traps of liquidation solutions.

Israeli Politics

Fourth: Political transformations in Israel.

In the beginning, the ideology was from the womb of European capitalist societies. The Zionist ideology arose, and it turned into an organized movement that held its first conference at the end of the 19th century. Its idea of establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine was officially adopted by British imperialism in the year 1917, until the establishment of the Zionist entity in 1948.

Since that date, the Zionist ideology has been translated into episodes and stages, in the form of policies, wars, positions, and programs for internal development and construction. It can be said that the Zionist ideology has, with the establishment of the Zionist entity, its complete executive tools. It has its own structures and institutions to which the settler community is subject.

As was evident in our previous presentation of economics, society, and strategy, all of them were subject to a comprehensive strategic plan: Gather [all] the settlers in our country [and put them] in the crucible of Zionism. In thought and practice, starting with submitting to its influences when making the decision to immigrate to Palestine, passing through the plan of assimilation, employment, recruitment, school, media, and other Zionist institutions that reshape the minds of these settlers to be consistent with the higher goals of the settlers' complex.

In light of the special circumstances surrounding this community and the revenues it receives from abroad in exchange for its strategic role in the region, what it did to itself was to preserve this role and ensure its transformation. In light of the special circumstance of the emergence of this entity, where the biblical ideological dimension played a decisive factor in this emergence, does it become incomprehensible to say that it is absurd or even impossible to separate Zionism from Israel?

The facts of yesterday - forty years ago - and the experiences of the present and the scientific vision of the future confirm this close connection between Zionism and its entity. Social differences are undeniable. Zionism is the official ideology of a society subject to its influences in various ways and forms, and the settler group benefits to this or that extent from its colonial mission. So how can we bet on separating Zionism from Israel?

It suffices to point out that everything reported about scientific-technological progress has only led to barbarism and fascism. The combination of science and racist ideology can only produce barbarism of a special kind, which is exactly what we are witnessing today in the occupied territory in the face of the intifada, and it is exactly what we witnessed. An extension of four centuries of organized official terrorism, massacres, murder, displacement, and extermination.

The achievements achieved by the enemy on the economic, social, and strategic levels that we talked about paved the basis for important transformations on the political level, as major changes occurred in political thinking. There have also been more important shifts in the weight of political forces in this entity.

If the idea of Greater Israel is presented today for actual translation in the language of the Zionist leaders, then the first goal of this expansionist plan will be to work to absorb the occupied territories in 1967. What is the ongoing dispute between the two poles of political life in Israel, the Likud and Al-Miraj - on this point, except a disagreement in evaluating the ability of Israel to transform ideology into policy, and begin to put it into practical implementation on the ground.

All of this is happening in light of an internal political atmosphere that is moving towards right-wing and extremist positions. In light of an actual policy that is gradually translating the slogan of Greater Israel into worse, by building the force with all its components or seeking to completely absorb the Palestinian and Arab land occupied in 1967.

This prompts us to talk, even in brief words, about the most prominent features of current political life in Israel and the relationship of that to the total transformations that have occurred in the structure and composition of this entity.

The first characteristic: The emergence of the phenomenon of split and merger was a historical matter in the Israeli partisan experience, but the new current matter is that these splits occur from the left to the right, and from the right to the extreme right, as reflected in the Israeli election lists in recent Knesset sessions.

The second characteristic: Although the game of hawks and doves within all Israeli parties is an old game, what is new about it is that the reins of affairs in these parties are shifting towards hawkish positions, at the expense of doves.

The third characteristic: The increasing concentration of political life towards the large blocs. While the number of blocs represented in the last Knesset was about 15 blocs, the share of the two large blocs was more than two-thirds of the electoral votes, and this percentage has remained almost constant since 1969.

The fourth characteristic: The increase in settler turnout for elections, such that the percentage in the last Knesset reached 80% of the total number of those entitled to vote.

The fifth characteristic: The increasing weight of the right in political life. In the first years of the founding of the Zionist entity, the right constituted only a modest percentage compared to the weight of the left. Then the gap between them began to shrink and narrow to reach a balance between them, then to the right's victory in the 1977 elections. Then the balance returned in 1984 when the ruling coalition government was formed.

Despite this balance, the majority still goes to the right, which has an important reserve of small extremist right-wing and religious parties that it

can resort to, to form a new government, as Yitzhak Shamir repeatedly threatened.

The sixth characteristic: The weak electoral weight of non-Zionist forces in the Jewish sector. The Communist Party - Rakah - with an overwhelming Arab majority - received in the last elections only 800 Jewish votes, that is, 3 per thousand of the votes of Jewish voters, compared to 36% for Al-Maraj - 34.7% for Likud and 13%% for Rabbi Kahane.

The seventh characteristic: The share of religious parties has increased to reach the highest level. It peaked in the 1961 elections - then returned to stability in the last two Knesset sessions, at around 11% of the total Jewish vote.

The eighth characteristic: The weight of the Mizrahi Jews increased in the last Knesset, reaching 31 members compared to 8 members in the 1961 elections. Two-thirds of them arrived through the Likud and Al-Miraj blocs, and not through the lists bearing their name, such as Tammy, who did not receive more than 1/5 of the votes.

The ninth characteristic: The weak representation of Arab voters in comparison to their size, as they constitute 10% of the people entitled to vote, but they represent only 508 of the number of members of the Knesset. This number has not increased since 1965.

The tenth characteristic: The emergence of the phenomenon of the peace camp in Israel during the last five years in a striking manner, due to the exposure of the criminal policy of the Zionist enemy in Lebanon and the occupied territories. Due to many internal and external influences, there is no room to discuss them here. Despite the importance of this phenomenon, it does not constitute a violation of the rule that governs political life in Israel, and we cannot in any way bet on a major role for it, at least at the current stage.

A reading of the most prominent features of political life in Israel and the changes and developments that have occurred to it indicates that it is

proceeding in parallel with the economic, social and strategic aspects. In the political transformations, we see the transformations witnessed in the demographic situation in terms of the immigrant groups that make up Israel becoming more and more separated from their own internal composition in favor of integration into a larger social formation, which is the issue that was decided by material factors created by the policy of controlling the social, living and educational gap that separates the different groups that make up the Jewish population of Israel.

The most prominent feature of political life in Israel is the expansion of the right-wing base and the decline of the positions of the Zionist left, and here we do not need to say the expressions of the right and the left. When it comes to Israel, it carries one ideological content, as the essence of the dispute here revolves around the ability to transform the ideological slogan into a political slogan and the ability to transform the real goal into a declared goal.

Long experience has revealed how fundamental the agreement was between the two poles of political life in Israel regarding everything related to the strategy and long-term goals of the Zionist project, and has proven that the boundaries of the disagreement do not deviate from its current political framework. It does not exceed the limits of the means that must be followed to reach the same goal. Perhaps the most prominent example of the validity of what we have said is that consensus has been achieved within the Zionist entity on the principles of resolute hostility to Palestine in name, people, cause, revolution, organization, and legitimate rights. This is what appears clear in the programs of the basic Zionist parties, where they stand out. Palestine as the complete fulminant of the idea of Zionism.

It also seems clearer in the foreign policy followed by the two poles of Israeli political life against the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism on the Arab and international arenas, which came as an extension and expression of the internal policy that is based on Zionism in thought and practice and meets global imperialism in the trenches and location. One especially with its most aggressive and reactionary circles.

This, in brief, is a brief picture of the most prominent trends and transformations that the Zionist entity has witnessed during the past four decades. We tried to point out the most important of them, and we do not claim that we have covered them all in this article.

We tried to focus specifically on the elements of power possessed by this entity. We have in mind the goal of contributing to refuting the simplistic, flat view of this entity, which makes it easy to describe it with all descriptions and characteristics instead of trying to understand it in a scientific and objective manner, which in our view is what constitutes the first condition. The first introduction to building a comprehensive Palestinian-Arab-UN confrontation strategy.

Lessons Learned

Lessons crystallized by the experience of our people's struggle over the past four decades.

As we are about to speak on the occasion of the ill-fated fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the state of Israel, we cannot help but pause, even if only for a moment, before some of the most prominent, what we can call the lessons of the mistakes, that accompanied the process of patriotic, national, Palestinian, and Arab confrontation with the Zionist invasion over a period of more than half a century.

If it is true that the starting point for such pauses must necessarily start from knowledge of the enemy; good, scientific, interconnected and comprehensive knowledge. If it is also true then this knowledge seems even more necessary in light of the false quantum of information about this enemy, and in light of the policy of ignorance and concealment followed by more than one hostile party. If all of this is true, then it is also correct that we continue this pause by monitoring the most prominent loopholes - the mistakes they committed during this period of time.

Knowledge of the enemy and a strict critical review of the course are two basic conditions that must be met in order to formulate a comprehensive confrontation strategy that rises to the level of challenges it throws at all of us: the Zionist-Imperialist Project.

The first of these lessons: Mistakes / The debate between the patriot and the nationalist in the equation of conflict with the Zionist enemy, and how this extremely important issue was dealt with.

There is no doubt that this issue has historically played a prominent and major role in shaping the Palestinian march, with its progress and decline, until it has become possible to say that. That is a mistake in looking at the equation of patriotism and nationalism in Palestinian action. If one of them dominates the other and extinguishes it, it will have the most dangerous and harmful results for the Palestinian struggle.

Perhaps the history of the Palestinian issue at this level is full of many [pieces of] evidence that confirm the validity of what we have said.

In 1936, the reactionary Arab and Hashemite position in particular contributed to thwarting the longest comprehensive popular strike that reached the point of civil disobedience, in the history of our people, and in 1939 - The Arab reactionary regimes contributed to thwarting the revolution that had broken out in Palestine, and worked through some Palestinian leadership circles to plant false and dangerous illusions and bets about the intentions of the colonial mandate authority. The same tragic scene was repeated in 1948, when the Arab armies led by Prince Abdullah entered Palestine. He asked the Palestinians to rely on the role of the Arab armies to liberate their country from the Zionist abomination. It was the well-known drama. Palestine was lost despite the resistance of its people and despite the valor of the Palestinian steadfastness. Since that date, the relationship between the patriot and the nationalist entered the circle of wrong treatment, as the national dimension of the Palestinian issue took precedence over its dimension for many considerations. The essential patriotic matter was complicated by the Jordanian reactionary entry into the conspiracy to obliterate, dissipate, and confiscate the national identity of our people.

Since it is impossible in this article to monitor the development that occurred in the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement's view of this issue, including our own view, we will suffice here with monitoring the most prominent stages that the development process went through. This, for us as a popular front, and before it as a movement of Arab nationalists.

The first stage: The stage extending from the year of the Nakba to the year of defeat (1948-1967), during which there was a clear predominance of the nationalist factor over the nationalist factor. We were working within the framework of the Arab Nationalist Movement at that time, and perhaps the reason for such a wrong view lies in a number of factors related to our level of development at that time, such as the spread of the liberal nationalist

tide and its taking a clear direction in its hostility to imperialism, which was expressed in its finest form - the Nasserist wave.

The patriotic factor prevailed over the national factor in the struggle against the Zionist enemy, but we had not neglected the Palestinian work, the Palestinian slogan, or the Palestinian program in our activity, and this matter began to develop gradually in our awareness and practice at many points, the most prominent of which was the formation of the Palestine Branch in the Nationalist Movement, ending with the announcement of the establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the end of 1967, where I can say that we have put our hand to the correct treatment of this problem.

The second stage: This is the stage that begins with the end of the year of defeat, and continues until today. This is the stage in which we worked through the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In it, we relied on the necessity of conserving, preserving and crystallizing the Palestinian identity within the framework of the Arab national public, and I can say that by entering this stage we have reached the correct treatment of this sensitive issue, despite everything that may be said about dangers here and there that accompanied the march.

In short, we can point out that dealing with this issue has produced two wrong tendencies in looking at this issue. They were formed in different historical stages, and they still coexist and struggle until the present moment. I have previously clarified this issue in a previous press interview, and so I find myself returning to it on this occasion.

The first tendency:

Which wants to subjugate the patriot to the nationalist, whether this is done under the slogan - unity is the path to Palestine - or other slogans. This tendency prevailed in the Arab liberation movement in the era extending from the 50s until the mid-60s. It accompanies its appearance with the emergence of the Arab national bourgeoisies and their struggle for national independence. This period was also characterized by the almost complete

absence of a special and distinct Palestinian national role. Our people have been subjected to attempts to obliterate, dissipate, and confiscate their identity, whether at the hands of the Zionist enemy, the Jordanian regime, or other Arab regimes.

The second tendency:

It is the Palestinian regional tendency, which takes the slogan, “Oh, we are alone,” as its means to market the logic of separation from the Arab national dimension, and to catch up with the declining Arab regional forces in a dangerous and destructive struggle. This tendency, which arose mainly as a reaction to obliteration, dissipation, and confiscation, derives its momentum from its combat dimension, where Palestinianism has become an accusation in many Arab countries, not to mention that it is a militant affiliation whose owners pay a heavy price under the yoke of the occupation and the brutality of its iron fist.

Palestinian regionalism is nourished by the Arab situation, which pushes towards hateful regionalism, sectarianism and dogmatism. It also feeds on the miserable reality that resulted in the false nationalist discourse, from which all that remains is its hostility to Palestinian nationalism and its efforts to abolish and confiscate it.

We cannot accept either of these two tendencies, as we have tried over the past forty years. It has become clear that without a correct understanding of the patriotic and nationalist debate, and without arriving at a scientific solution to this equation, many problems will arise as a result of this.

As we think about the battle for liberation and national independence, we cannot help but calculate the totality of the constants at this level, the most important of which is:

First: Palestinian nationalism, and the necessity of crystallizing the Palestinian entity, which is currently embodied by the PLO. This is the only thing that keeps our cause in its proper place as the issue of a people,

self-determination, and legitimate national rights, not an issue of borders and refugees.

Therefore, caring for the Palestinian character, the Palestinian identity, and preserving it from squandering and confiscation, is a process of confronting the Christian, Zionist character. If we may call it that, it is the opposite of this personality and its alternative on Palestinian land. It is a weapon against Judaization on the one hand, and Urduization and annexation on the other hand.

It goes without saying that the Palestinian personality is confirmed in this sense, not the opposite. For the Arab national character, it is not the opposite of the national dimension of the issue, but rather the complement and completion of this dimension.

Second: The national dimension of the Palestinian issue is that there is no Palestinian movement that is interactive and harmonious with its national environment. It is not possible to think seriously and responsibly about the battle of national liberation, nor about preserving the gains of the people and the revolution, and we do not say that based only on the national connection to the Palestinian national issue, but also based on the specificity of the Palestinian issue, the Palestinian diaspora, the bases of the foundation and its importance, the nationalism of the struggle against the Zionist enemy, the transformation of the Israeli factor into an internal factor in relation to the struggles of many of the peoples of our Arab nation and other considerations that push us to accept the close connection between the national struggle and national income.

Of course, we are now speaking in general language: considerations of space and narrowness of scope, but we realize that the issue of the patriot and nationalist debate is too intertwined to be raised in this brief way.

Third: Our interest in Palestinian nationalism, and in particular the Palestinians, should not push us towards regionalism, the most harmful and dangerous of which is chauvinism. Likewise, our interest in the national dimension of the conflict should not push us into the problem of

dissolution and dissipation of the Palestinian identity, even if the national movement is Nasserist or progressive in style, without ambiguity or controversy.

Fourth: The importance of the correct solution to the patriotic and nationalist equation leads us to research the relationship of the revolution with the Arab masses and its relationship with the Arab regimes. If a logic prevails in dealing with the Arab situation that focuses on the relationship with the Arab regimes and not with the masses, with whom the relationship has remained governed by mostly temporary tactical considerations.

Therefore, a correction in the organization's relations with the Arab situation must begin with correcting the relationship with the Arab masses and making them the axis on which Palestinian-Arab relations are based.

Fifth: The Palestinian National Movement. As an essential part of the camp of liberation, progress and peace in the world, it cannot help but be biased towards the progressive camp on the Arab level.

This bias, and the organizations and factions of the oppressors, must be decided by virtue of the nature of the Palestinian revolution and its position in the ongoing conflict at the internal, national and international levels. It is not permissible for our nation to unite from the strong practices of some Arab progressive forces, as a means of eliminating the differences between national and progressive forces and regimes, reactionary and puppet ones.

The most important question is that is it permissible to confuse the two camps? Are the progressives equal in practice to the reactionaries in practice in their position on the Palestinian issue? Is it permissible, accordingly, to maintain the same level of relations between these two parties?

Sixth: Our camp bias does not prevent progress at the Arab level, nor does it conflict with the establishment of Palestinian-Arab relations. On a broader scale, it includes the so-called conservative Arab regimes that are

not directly involved in conspiracies against the Palestinian people, their national cause, and their armed revolution.

If we take all of these points into consideration, the point of view regarding the controversy of Palestinian-Arab relations boils down to preserving the Palestinian national identity, within the framework of The close dialectical connection to the Arab nationalist general in siding with the Arab progressive camp, represented primarily by the masses of the Arab nation, without closure and even openness to all Arab regimes that are not directly involved in the plots to liquidate the Palestinian cause.

This point of view stems from the rejection of isolated Palestinian regionalism, which uses the weakness of the Arab situation as a cover to spread despair and frustration, and reject regionalism, sectarianism, and dogmatism, as an expression of the state of weakness and rupture in which the existing Arab situation is experiencing. It also rejects the false nationalist discourse that uses the slogans of Arab nationalism as a cover to justify its incompetence, on the one hand, and the endeavor to communicate that confiscates the independent Palestinian national role, on the other hand.

The decisive conclusion here is summarized in the following words: It is not permissible to change the patriotic factor in any circumstances, and this factor may not be separated from its necessary national dimension.

The second of these lessons: The international factor in the conflict.

As we stand before the experience of forty years since the establishment of the Zionist enemy, we cannot help but notice the great influence that world public opinion and the international community played in establishing this entity, preserving and supporting it over many years.

Had it not been for the international consensus burdened by the shadow of Nazism and its hateful specter, and had it not been for the false illusions that leaked into some friendly and allied circles in that period about the

reality of the Zionist project in Palestine, when what happened, happened, perhaps the entire history of the region would have turned out differently.

Today, in light of the increasing intensity of interconnectedness between the regional and international episodes of conflict, as the entire world appears to be one arena, the battle to win public opinion and the international community seems more important than ever. There appears to be no disdain or contempt for the value of the international community. A kind of childish adventure that causes harm to one's career: our struggle on the national and international arenas.

The collapse of Israel's image in the eyes of world public opinion and its true appearance as one of the most powerful reactionary forces that contribute to threatening world peace and stability is considered part of the vanguard of the reactionary imperialist attack, which is working to curb the development of the revolutionary and liberation movement in the world. The emergence of Israel in this way is the first and necessary prelude to our success in the battle to recover the full legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

As we mentioned earlier, the past forty years have revealed the curtain on Israel's reactionary - fascist - racist essence, and all we have to do is fight our battle with skill and knowledge, in order to win increasing circles of sympathizers and supporters of our legitimate struggle.

Israel has a strategic alliance with American imperialism. It plays the role of nourishing and supporting the counter-revolution in Africa and Latin America, and engages with the military industrial community in America in the midst of Star Wars. After possessing the atomic bomb and the means of transporting it - the Jericho-2 missile - which now threatens the south of the Soviet Union.

The bet on our success in winning this battle is a tangible bet, and has a realistic possibility of success, and we have come a long way on this path, especially after the outbreak of the popular uprising in the occupied

territories, which revealed to the world the racist - fascist essence of this entity.

However, success in winning this battle has conditions that must be met, the most important of which are two: peace. The first is to maintain the Palestinian national strength and momentum and ensure the escalation of the graphic line of this struggle. The world, no matter how much it understands our issue and our tragedies, does not respect the weak, and the power of logic is no substitute for the logic of force at all. In addition to that, the accuracy and clarity of the political line of the Palestinian revolution plays a decisive role in this second area, approaching without negligence the position of the international community and staying away as much as possible from the tense positions that would widen the gap between the personal national position and the position on the international front.

Convergence with the position of the international community is necessary, especially since the international community today seems more understanding of the justice of our national cause. This was expressed in a number of decisions and positions taken by international bodies and organizations, and various regional and international blocs, from socialist and non-aligned countries to the Organisation of African Unity and [the Organisation of] Islamic Conference.

How can we meet the position of the international community and how can we, at the same time, maintain the essence of our demands and goals, and not fall into the category of compromising our full and undiminished rights? Is there a way to resolve this apparent contradiction between our acceptance of international will? Its decisions and our adherence to our final slogans?

We will try to answer these questions and inquiries as much as this article allows.

How do we meet the international will, with the main trend of global public opinion, so that we do not appear isolated from the movement of the world and its influential forces?

The starting point in answering this question is the necessity of formulating a transitory political program that falls within the scope of historical possibility - and enjoys the acceptance, sympathy and support of the majority in the international community. Because merely repeating final general slogans that may not be understood by many international circles will not lead us to the ability to rally and to mobilize the broadest sectors of world public opinion in our battle against the enemies' front, hence the transitory program of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The program of return, self-determination, and building an independent state. Hence our call for the program, our adoption of it, and our defense of it as a program for the Palestinian national consensus. A program that enjoys support, the overwhelming majority in the international community.

It goes without saying that the success of the Palestinian people, in regaining their legitimate rights to return to their homeland and build their independent state, will rightfully worship more than half of the path to overthrowing the Zionist-imperialist project in our country, and achieving the ultimate goals of our people and nation.

This might be said, for example, in objecting to the concept of transiency in the Palestinian struggle. Achieving any transitory solution will block the way to a strategic solution to the Palestinian issue, which we will talk about in answering the second question.

Secondly:

How can we meet the will of the international community without compromising or wasting the full national rights of our people in their homeland? How can we resolve this contradiction? The bet in resolving this paradox is based on the firm confidence in exposing the truth of this devastating cancerous monster, in front of the broadest circles of world public opinion, which in 1948 thought that it had planted a meek lamb

among our ranks, in the oasis of democracy, in the desert of oppression and Arab barbarism.

We are not exaggerating in this or proceeding from hypothetical illusions. Little by little, the world is getting closer to realizing the reality of this entity.

The Israeli strategy is based on - a concept of the enemy, which includes those who have been attacked and will be attacked, as well as their existing and potential allies for religious, national and political reasons. The danger according to this strategy is not only from the enemy's actual capabilities, but also from the potential and unexploited capabilities. The enemy does not only aim to strike the existing danger, but also the crystallized [danger] and the potential [danger].

In light of this concept of the enemy, the concept of force is determined to include its content, policy, and components, so that military power is the result of comprehensive economic, human, social, and scientific power.

Under the guidance of this strategy, a memorandum of strategic understanding was signed between Israel and American imperialism, which underwent development and deepening. The Zionist entity now occupies the same position as the members of NATO in the network of the imperialist alliance.

Regardless of the details of this memorandum and the subsequent annexes and additions that make Israel the spearhead of the counterattack on the forces of peace, progress and socialism in the world, the essence of the equation that has come to govern the Zionist core is that the imperialist position can be summed up as follows: Israel serves the imperialist project at the global level, while global imperialism stands at the service of the regional purposes of the Zionist project.

This equation has been translated many times and on many ugly occasions. Israel has provided more than one service to global imperialism, especially in the fields of power, where many reasons make it impossible

for the United States to play a direct role: I invite Israel to play this role on behalf of the leader of the imperialist camp.

And in return, over the years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Washington has proven that it places Israel and its projects at its disposal. Great regionalism, all the capacities and capabilities available to the imperialist camp.

It is the relationship that rises from the level of the tool - the employee, to the level of the tool - the partner - in the system of global interests of the hostile camp.

In light of this supreme Israeli strategic vision, and the nature of the relationship between the Zionist core and the imperial core, it becomes natural to say that the connection has become close and tight between the success of the Palestinian people in snatching their final goals from the evidence of the Zionist monster and the success of all the forces of peace, progress, liberation and socialism in inflicting defeats on the imperialist core. The battle against these two reactionary cores becomes one battle, even if its arenas and weapons differ. However, the forces involved in it are the same.

Of course, transition[al goals] is not all we can resort to politically to win a battle in world public opinion. The intense conflict taking place today over the issue of holding an international peace conference in the Middle East is also a battle, and a fierce battle between the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution at various regional and international levels.

The international conference that we call for is the field of struggle of wills and a means to form the broadest circles of world public opinion against Zionist intransigence and arrogance.

It has become clear today that Israel and the United States are almost the two countries that refuse to hold an international conference with full powers, under the auspices of the United Nations, in the presence of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and with the equal

participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinian position in support of and calling for holding this conference has had an impact. The great goal was to move the ball to the Israeli court, as the direction of international pressure began to shift from the Palestinian-Arab circle to the Israeli circle.

As is known, a tense policy towards the international conference was likely to impose an atmosphere of isolation and suffocation on Palestinian national action. How can the Palestinian situation be imagined - on the international scene, without the support and backing of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist system? Along with other friendly and allied countries? And how can the Palestinian situation be imagined in light of the sharp difference in positions with the allies of the revolution at the international level?

A serious, comprehensive confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance is not possible without the consensus of the pillars of the Palestinian-Arab-international confrontation camp, and this consensus must be achieved on the basis of a specific political program with clear and specific goals. This program, as experience has shown, should fall within the framework of the historical possibility. As experience has also shown, the program of return, self-determination, and building an independent state is this historical possibility - in the foreseeable future, perhaps at the Fifth [National] Conference. As we have explained, its conditions are the appropriate mechanism for translating this program and transferring it into effect.

With this vision, we can confront the Israeli episode with the Palestinian episode, we can confront the Zionist episode with the nationalist episode, and we can confront imperialism with the international episode. All of this is within the framework of comprehensive, continuous and persevering confrontation until complete freedom and independence are achieved.

As for the transition from the space of transitory slogans to the space of strategic and final slogans, it depends on our ability to make this process

also within the framework of the historical possibility, and not within the framework of propaganda and evangelism. Perhaps the starting point in our endeavor begins with working to convince our allies that the enemy they are facing is not only a threat to the Palestinian people or to the Arab nation, but rather a threat to the peace and stability of the world. A danger that threatens all the forces of liberation, peace, progress, and socialism.

If Israel and Zionism play a role in the counter-revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America and its attempt to sabotage socialist countries through active involvement in the projects of Washington and Western circles in this area. If it attempts to represent the Jewish question on the agenda of the socialist countries by raising the issue of Jewish immigration and carrying out the broadest campaigns of counter-propaganda and incitement against socialism. If Israel is doing all of this, it will undoubtedly provide us with the objective basis for success in this mission of ours. All we have to do is be good at exploiting this objective circumstance through a sound policy that does not drop the strategy into the calculations of current and transitory tactics. Do not close your eyes to the ultimate goals of the Palestinian people.

The third of these lessons: The [occupied] interior and exterior debate.

This issue became particularly prominent in the wake of the 1967 War, when the rest of the Palestinian territories were subjected to the yoke of the Zionist occupation. Nearly half of the Palestinian people, whether in the areas occupied in 1948 or the areas occupied in 1967, have become subject to occupation.

Before 1967, the Palestinian core abroad had not yet emerged clearly and decisively. Palestinian action was only taking its first steps. As for the Palestinians inside, they were the Palestinians of 1948. Their struggle role had not yet crystallized in the way that these regions are witnessing now, and since that date, there has been a wide debate about the nature of the relationship between the interior and the exterior. Perhaps one side of the equation has often been given priority over the other, especially the

exterior’s dominance over the interior. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was the forefront of the movement that said that there were two basic pillars of the Palestinian revolution. Neither of them can cancel or dispense with the other.

The first pillar:

It is the most important [pillar], the income of occupied Palestine. Half of our people there fight daily in fierce battles of confrontation with political liquidation projects and attempts to abolish the national identity of our people. Judaization and settlement conspiracies, the job-sharing plan, the appointments conspiracy, and attempts to create a reactionary leadership alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization. In short, against the occupation's policies and its repeated attempts to liquidate our people's national cause. Whether by direct means of violence or through joint political plans with the Jordanian regime.

The second pillar:

It was represented in the main body of the revolution, with its leadership and media institutions and its military, political and social apparatuses. After which Jordan moved to Lebanon following the Amman and Jerash massacres of 1970-1971 - and which today faces more problems resulting from the siege that followed the 1982 war.

The second basic pillar of the revolution has been exposed over the past twenty years or more to multilateral attempts to uproot and liquidate it, and our people have pushed because of the adherence to this pillar, thousands of martyrs were martyred in battles against the Zionist enemy.

Or in the battles against the Arab parties that made various attempts to liquidate the Palestinian rifle.

Throughout the years that constituted the life of the contemporary Palestinian revolution, the dialectical relationship between the two pillars was growing and strengthening, as one was influenced by the other. Negative and positive, and influenced by it, up or down. One of them

worked to fill any relative vacuum resulting from the temporary weakness that befell the other until it could rise again so that our people at home and abroad could continue their struggle, united in all their arenas under the same flags and for the same goals. Within the framework of the same leadership and entity of the Palestine Liberation Organization, it is true that whenever we see (the interior has taken over) the ugly image of struggle as a result of a widespread intifada or a major popular uprising. It is also true that at other times we see the exterior and it has taken over this image as a result of the escalation of the Palestinian armed struggle across the borders. Or as a result of the intensification of the ferocity of the external aggression and the armed popular response to it, as happened in the war of invasion and the siege of Beirut in 1982. But what is also true is that we were in the process of this deep dialectical interaction, this deep connection between the interior and the exterior. How could we not? We are one people with a cause. One, one leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This interconnectedness did not limit its effects to the Palestinian national side. The enemies also, by virtue of their awareness of this interconnectedness, launched attacks in an organized and coordinated manner against both the interior and the exterior. Every time the Palestinian revolution outside the occupied territory was exposed to war or aggression, the eye was on the occupied land, the field that is intended to be a crossing point for the second episode of the Camp David Accords.

Every time the occupied land was subject to iron fists, brutal campaigns, and terrorism, the eyes of the enemies were fixed on striking the influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization abroad, and flapping its wings as the most prominent obstacle to the American solution, which brings the issue of our people back to its true perspective. As an issue of national liberation and independence and self-determination.

So this is the internal and external debate. The experience of the years confirmed it, and the moments of ups here or downs there did not diminish its significance.

There is no doubt that in some stages of the Palestinian struggle, the exterior prevailed over the interior. Especially in the years of the Palestine Liberation Organization's widespread and distinguished public presence in Lebanon before 1982, and we can even acknowledge it. It is our duty to acknowledge. The first pillar - the interior - has often not received sufficient attention from the factions of the Palestinian revolution.

Although this mistake has its known circumstances and causes, we cannot underestimate its seriousness - or accept its continuation or repetition.

No matter how important the second pillar of the Palestinian revolution is, the occupied land remains the main arena over which the conflict is resolved through interconnection and interaction with the outside world, and with the Arab and international circles as well.

In these blessed days, when the valiant intifada of our people erupts and enters its sixth month. It is emerging within our ranks. Outside our ranks there are voices that belittle the second pillar of the revolution, as those with viewpoints wave opinions and positions that belittle the importance of this Palestinian national work abroad and even consider it secondary.

Such opinions were previously put forward in 1982, especially after the outbreak of the camp war in Lebanon, where some reached the wrong and dangerous conclusion that the second pillar reached a dead end. We have no choice but to be satisfied with working inside the occupied territories.

If we exclude from consideration - bad intentions and liquidation, which lies behind some of these calls, and if we assume, with good intentions, we say that we are facing a wrong and dangerous point of view of the interior, which is considered a basic and crucial pillar, it cannot achieve the full legitimate national rights of our people without its connection to the struggle abroad, without a deeper and closer connection with the struggle of the masses and their national forces on the Arab arena, and without a close alliance with the struggle of the socialist movement for peace, progress and liberation across the international arena.

If today we stand before the heroic epic being written by the masses of our people inside the occupied territory, then we stand before the role that the Palestinian revolution and the masses of our people outside the occupied territory must play, in addition to the role required of the national liberation movement on the national arena and the allies and friends on the international arena.

The conclusion we come up with after this extensive presentation of the debate on the relationship between interior and exterior is that the Palestinian revolution, which has been based since the dawn of its first inception on two basic pillars, today continues and continues as a result of the interaction of these two pillars, and if we give decisive priority to the first pillar inside the occupied territory, it is not permissible for us, under no circumstances, to cancel or diminish the importance of the second basic pillar of the revolution abroad.

After this conclusion, we must, as we talk about the interior and exterior, distinguish between the specificity of this or that Palestinian faction. We should note the distinctive role that this or that faction can play in the long struggle of our people. When we talk about the interior, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied since 1967, immediately come to mind. As for the occupied territories in 1948, they are often overlooked.

This view is wrong as well. The part of our people and land that has been subject to the Zionist occupation since 1948 is an integral part of the Palestinian people and land, and work must be done in every way to activate its role and increase its contribution to the epic heroic struggle that our people are waging against its enemies. We must raise this role from the level of active support and solidarity to the level of actual participation. We must ignite the spark of the intifada to Galilee, the Triangle, Nazareth, the Negev, and every occupied city and village in Palestine, all of Palestine.

Perhaps this is what worries the Zionist enemy the most, as its members of leadership express their fears about the circumstances changing in these

areas. The flame of the intifada passed through what they called the Green Belt, burning it, and with it attempts to domesticate our people.

This weapon - the weapon of our masses in the occupied territories in 1948 - has not been used yet, and we must seriously think about how to best use this weapon in its fullest way.

Regarding abroad, and despite the importance of Palestinian gatherings in various diaspora regions, especially in Lebanon, the Palestinian gathering in Jordan has exceptional importance that we must pay attention to. Paying attention to the extent to which it will be affected if we succeed in activating this vital part of our people.

There are many reasons for this, including:

The size of this gathering and its relative weight within the Jordanian arena, where it constitutes the majority of the population.

The peculiarity of the relationship between the masses of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, which is united by one cause, one trench, one destiny, and one goal. Even a single national movement - the specificity of the role that the Jordanian regime played and continues to play in passing the imperialist - Zionist - reactionary plans aimed at eliminating the cause of our people under many names and labels.

Geographical consideration. The state of contact existing between the two banks of the Jordan River and the fact that this country maintains the longest borders with the Israeli enemy.

For all these and other considerations, the Palestinian community in Jordan is of special importance in the context of foreign affairs. We must give it adequate and appropriate attention.

For all these reasons, our Fourth National Conference - 1981 - was not limited to talking about the two pillars of the revolution and the rules of its foundation abroad. Rather, he paused at length about the specificity and fundamentality of the Jordanian arena.

The fourth of these lessons: Armed struggle and various forms of struggle.

Perhaps among the most prominent mistakes - lessons crystallized by previous experience is the necessity of creatively mixing various forms of struggle, and not falling into the mistake of giving priority to one over the other or replacing one form with another.

The time of our revolution came - the years of its first inception in particular - when only armed struggle was heard - so much so that the official documents of the Liberation Organization, for many years stipulated that armed struggle was the only method of struggle.

With the development of the revolution, our vision of this issue matured and crystallized, especially when the revolution was able to enter, with remarkable success, the doors of the political, diplomatic, media and other mass struggle.

This, of course, does not mean diminishing the importance of the armed struggle or pushing it to the second place. The armed struggle was, is, and will remain the main form of struggle. It was, is, and will remain the lever on which all achievements have risen. The important political achievements of our people. The lever through which our cause, our revolution, and the PLO reached the position and status it has today, Palestinian, Arab, and international.

But the thing that must be emphasized is that the armed struggle alone, without its connection to political, diplomatic, media and public action, remains short of achieving the goals and achievements that our people aspire to and for which they make great sacrifices. Its battle with the Zionist enemy is a comprehensive battle in every sense of the word, as the enemy is fighting us with weapons, politics, diplomacy, finance, economics, and the media. The battle of history, heritage, and culture is also fought against us. Therefore, we must confront it in turn in these various fields.

We must be good at managing our political and diplomatic battles and continue our efforts to isolate this entity internationally and show it for what it is. We must mobilize all our forces to strip it of the supremacy of the Western media machine and achieve the support of the broadest sectors of opinion. In order to use the weapon of the media in this battle, we must engage in a battle with him on the economic front, so that it pursues his interests or strikes them and deprives him of any opportunity to benefit from them in developing his economic and social structure. We must expose his attempts to steal our history, our culture, our heritage, and our women's clothing.

And we must, and this is the most important thing, make every Palestinian a role in this battle inside the occupied land, in the countries of the encirclement, and the Arab countries in the distant diaspora. We must make our struggle performance an integrated symphony for each individual of our people, his specific role in it.

In addition, we in the revolution have the primary responsibility to renew all the brotherly, friendly and allied forces on the Arab and international arenas, in order to strike the alliance of Israel and its close connection to Zionism and global imperialism.

The experiences of the victorious peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have taught us to resort to weapons, for combative armed struggle against enemies. But these same experiences teach us at the same time the importance of resorting to various methods of struggle and not underestimating any of them at all.

We are in dire need as we face an enemy that wants to completely deny our existence, erase our identity, dissipate our culture, and falsify our history. To divert the world's attention from our legitimate right, and in light of this privacy, we do not need to learn to wage struggle on all fronts and fields and with various weapons, rifles, books, numerous paintings, popular costumes, diplomacy, media, and others.

We are also in great need, as we face a racist fascist enemy armed to the teeth from head to toe, to cling to the option of armed struggle as a major and decisive option.

The fifth of these lessons: Not placing the strategy of the youth's war in the face of other strategies.

Other information:

Among the mistakes - the lessons - that must be taken into consideration as we are about to talk about the ill-fated fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Zionist entity - is not to place the strategy of the long-term people's war in contradiction and confrontation with the strategy of classic conventional wars.

For many years, opinions and viewpoints have prevailed among our ranks that talk about the strategy of long-term people's war as the only valid strategy for confronting the imperialist Zionist enemy. It was considered the strategy of conventional war.

Conventional [warfare] is a failed strategy and is not suitable for confronting the enemy camp. The reasons behind the emergence of this view, which still maintains extensions within the Palestinian ranks, are due to:

Some victorious experiences through which small peoples achieved decisive victories over the reactionary-imperialist enemy that was superior to them with weapons of lethality and destruction, and with their possession of powerful technology and resources.

The complicity of some Arab regimes and their incompetence to play their required role in the struggle to restore Palestinian and Arab rights.

These regimes take the enemy's superiority as a pretext to avoid waging a decisive confrontation with the Zionist enemy. Rather, they continually seek to prevent the Palestinian people from being able to wage their long-term war against the Zionist enemy under the pretext of preparing for a

comprehensive war with the enemy or under the pretext of avoiding involvement in a war for which no preparations have been completed.

It was not unlikely that some opinions would emerge among us that put the two strategies in contradiction with each other.

For our part, we were, still are, and will remain supporters of the long-term people's war strategy. Long term to confront the imperialist - Zionist - enemy that is superior to us in its resources, weapons, and ability to lethal and destroy. We were and still are advocates of mobilizing the energies of the Palestinian people and all Arab peoples in this battle of confrontation to break the enemy's superiority and move steadily towards achieving the goals of our people and the peoples of our Arab nation.

But at the same time, we do not see that the strategy of people's war contradicts the strategy of conventional - classical war. Rather, it may have been complementary to it if the political goals and visions were unified and the correct foundations and foundations for a clearly defined patriot - nationalist - Palestinian - Arab front were crystallized.

Perhaps the experience of the October 1973 war provides evidence of this. In this war there is preparation. The Arab soldier was confident in himself, and the Arab fighter demonstrated his distinctive ability to absorb modern weapons, use them efficiently, and engage in battles, some of which were among the largest battles in modern military history against the Zionist enemy.

Had it not been for the bad, complicit and incapable political management to which the war was subjected by Sadat, the results would not have been what they are today. Not only on the political level, but also on the field level related to the course of the war itself and the field results that led to it, as has become clear today.

For all this reason, the people's war strategy should not be placed in opposition to the classic [conventional] war strategy. Rather, it is necessary

to look into the complementarity of the two strategies and not their contradiction.

The sixth of these lessons: Strategy and Tactics - The Relationship Controversy:

Among the most prominent lessons that emerged from the experience was also the controversy of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Palestinian political action.

It is not enough, for example, to define our strategic and long-term goals, nor is it enough to draw a structural plan for the enemies' front and the friends' front, as despite the utmost importance of that, this matter alone is not enough.

What is required, on the other hand, is to draw up the correct tactical steps that lead to the final goals. What is also required is to monitor all conflicts and contradictions within the opponent's camp, so that it will then be possible to employ them and benefit from them in our partial and comprehensive battles against this enemy.

What is required is to carefully monitor the existing balance of power and know what demands and goals can be extracted at each stage. Formulating tactical slogans commensurate with the existing balance of power. It is also required to conduct a careful study to determine the central episode in each stage to avoid getting lost in the pile of many tasks, which of course do not occupy the same level of importance. Finally, what is required is to draw alliances accurately in light of all these considerations, as this task seems essential, and without it, it is impossible to move successfully towards our transitory and final goals.

We are not exaggerating anything if we say that the official approval of the transitory program of the Palestine Liberation Organization in late 1979 played an important role in rationalizing the Palestinian struggle movement and setting goals for it within the limits of historical possibility. This

program changed it from an advanced level in the development of Palestinian awareness and thought.

The battle that we are waging today on the international conference front contributes to enriching our struggle with more allies and friends on the international scene, and contributes to our success in winning increasing circles of global public opinion.

These examples, and there are dozens of others, clearly demonstrate the importance of mastering tactics in our political struggle and not being satisfied with presenting general slogans.

Regarding the issue of the controversy over the relationship between strategy and tactics, two wrong tendencies have emerged on the Palestinian scene.

The first is of a pragmatic nature, expressing the national bourgeoisie's distress at the burden of continuing the struggle and the shaking of its confidence in the ability to extract the rights of our people and their ultimate goals.

Therefore, we noticed how those who hold this point of view often behaved impatiently and how at other times they prevailed over the immediate and immediate tactics over the final, long-term strategy.

We also noticed a tendency among these people to retreat from distant goals under the pressure of the conditions of the current moment and others.

The most dangerous thing that could face us is to forget and ignore, in the midst of our daily struggle and practices of political tactics, our strategic goals, and thus to create the necessary compass to rationalize our path and light the way for our people.

The second is a tendency with a dogmatic nature that is content with repeating major and strategic slogans, refrains from practicing political

tactics, and looks at the opponent's front through a black-and-white lens. You do not see any political shades among them.

The danger of this tendency lies in the fact that it leads to nihilism, isolationism, and separation from the real political movement, and in that it leads its followers to the margins of the political movement, thus losing their ability to act and influence.

In contrast, we see that the scientific position - as demonstrated by experience, is based on the following foundations:

A - The necessity of crystallizing: the strategic goals of the people and the revolution and precisely identifying the enemy and friendly camps.

B - After that, understand the role of the political leadership in formulating and deriving the transitory tasks for national action in light of the conditions and balances existing at this or that stage.

C - Proficiency in linking tactics, transitory goals, and strategic goals, so that we then have a series of connected episodes, one of which leads to the other. There is no tactic that is separate from the strategy and outside of its seriousness.

D - The practice of political tactics includes, among other things, seeing the subtle differences between the parties of the enemy camp, but it does not for a single moment lose sight of these parties as part of one camp.

These are some of the most prominent features of the dialectical relationship between tactics and strategy, as proven by our experience over the past forty years.

Just as the enemy succeeded in achieving its goals, one after another, to reach what it is today, we, in turn, must succeed in completing the process of return to the homeland, self-determination, and building an independent Palestinian state, through continuous and tireless struggle. In this process we must not lose the compass that points to our rights in our entire

country, to the ultimate goals of our people, without isolation or segregation, but also without waste or negligence.

The seventh of these lessons: The class issue and the importance of a firm political line in confronting the enemy.

In our stand before the forty-year march of continuous struggle against the Zionist entity that was planted on our land, we must stand before the most prominent stations that accompanied this march.

In our own experience, we stop at the two most prominent lessons that emerged from the experience of the Arab Nationalist Movement:

The first lesson:

This experience lacks the precise scientific balance that is required in considering the issue of the debate between the patriot and the nationalist, where, as I previously indicated, we used to prevail between the patriot over the nationalist, until we reached the year of defeat in 1967. So we reconsidered in a serious way and were comprehensive in this vision, which is what was expressed by the experience of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The second lesson:

We lacked in that era - the era of the Arab nationalists - the class view, which did not put all classes of people on an equal footing within the framework of the Arab national liberation movement. Rather, we could distinguish between the role of this class or that.

Today, more than twenty years after the moment of transition from the movement's framework to the Front's framework, we are increasingly convinced of the importance of these two conclusions.

It is true that we are still within the framework of the stage of the national democratic revolution, and even that we are still in its first stages of national liberation. It is also true that this stage requires the involvement of

all classes of the people in the revolutionary process, including the bourgeoisie, but it is also true that not every class has the same role in this process of struggle.

The simplest extrapolation of the history of the contemporary Palestinian experience indicates without ambiguity or vagueness that the class leadership of the Palestinian national action, and in the various stages it went through, bore responsibility - even if only partially - for the results we reached. This happened in the years 1936-1939, and the same thing was repeated in 1948. No one can mention that the current class leadership of the revolution bears a share of responsibility for the results it reached, whether negative or positive.

It became clear through our review of the lessons and mistakes that accompanied the march how important and essential was the emergence and crystallization of the firm political line in confronting the enemy, whether in terms of curbing right-wing tendencies and trends, and resisting the adventurous, nihilistic approach.

Over the course of more than two decades, the revolution and the organization have faced stages and turning points in which the utmost importance of such decisive luck became evident. Perhaps the experience of the past five years and the accompanying exacerbation of negligent tendencies on the one hand, and the emergence of an adventurous and nihilistic approach on the other hand, is the best evidence of the nature of the role played by the revolutionary democratic forces in this regard.

Beyond that, the emergence and growing role of the revolutionary democratic movement is the basis for preserving, preserving and strengthening the overall national line of the revolution. It is the indispensable condition to ensure achieving our ultimate goals.

Now What?

Forty years have passed since the rape of Palestine and the Zionist entity being planted on our land with iron and fire, blood and massacres. Forty years have passed and with it a record full of struggles and great sacrifices made by our people and the peoples of our Arab nation.

As we indicated at the beginning of this article, the enemy succeeded in achieving a number of strategic goals, while the Palestinian and Arab struggle movement remained unable to achieve such successes.

We talked about the elements of strength of this entity. We briefly mentioned the most prominent of these elements. We also talked about the elements of weakness that accompanied our struggle. In both cases, we aimed to refute the prevailing simplistic opinions, and the other side of the picture was not absent from our minds: the enemy's weaknesses and the elements of strength that he possesses.

Since there is not enough space here to talk extensively about this aspect of the picture, we will suffice with pointing out two basic points:

The first point:

If the Zionist entity arose and developed due to the backing and support of the outside Western [powers] and made deliberate use of this support; this support according to a clearly defined strategic plan, then there is no doubt that the outside Western [powers] will be its weak point and its death.

This entity has been able to develop throughout these four decades under relatively comfortable conditions. It is true that he fought six wars with the Arabs, but all of them, with a limited exception - the October War and the 1982 war, were cheap wars in comparison to the size of the achievements he achieved.

In a situation like this, it was possible for it to make a decisive step toward building its advanced social and economic structure, and to move to the ranks of a major regional state.

The countdown point in the path of this entity begins when Israel finds itself in inappropriate terms and conditions to continue on this path.

Perhaps it goes without saying that such terms and conditions will not be achieved automatically and as a result of the movement and development of the internal laws that govern this entity that the matter requires action from the outside, a national liberation movement - Palestinian, united with the Arab National Liberation Movement - that contributes to thwarting Israel's strategic projects. It made the cost of its occupation of Palestinian land very high. It is not possible to pay it from the Israeli pocket, as a step towards making the Israeli presence extremely expensive and impossible to pay for from the imperialist pocket.

The enemy's strengths are the same points that we can turn into points of weakness and death. The enemy is working with his aggressive, racist policy to create his own gravedigger. It seeks to annihilate the Palestinian people and erase their personality. If it plays the role of a policeman, if it seeks to play the role of spearhead against the camp of peace, liberation, progress and socialism in the world, then it will mobilize the energies of the Palestinian people, who reject genocide and cling to their rights - and mobilize the energies of the Arab nation, whose development this entity is working to curb, just as it mobilizes the energies of the forces of peace and progress in the world.

In doing so, he is effectively creating his own gravedigger. It proves concretely that it is going against the [progressive] direction of history.

This, of course, requires a Palestinian - Arab and international action - different from what currently exists, which brings us to talk about the second point.

The second point:

It is necessary to formulate a supreme strategy for the Palestinian - Arab - international confrontation that ensures the employment of the energies of the entire Palestinian people at home, in Jordan and in the diaspora, in

various fields and levels - political, military, diplomatic, economic, media and cultural - side by side with the energies of our Arab nation and its national and liberation forces, and within the framework of a close strategic alliance with the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism in the world.

Developing the features of such a strategy should start from a deep and accurate understanding of the Zionist entity. It should also start from a comprehensive scientific review of our struggle during the past forty years.

If we had talked about some of the most prominent - not all the lessons - mistakes that accompanied our experience, it would not have addressed the aspects of the strategy of comprehensive confrontation with the enemy. This is because we consider that such a strategy has included its basic features in the Front's literature and the documents of its successive conferences, especially the Fourth National Conference.

This article is nothing but an attempt to enrich and crystallize this strategy, or rather a call for a deep and comprehensive dialogue between the various trends of national - democratic - Palestinian - and Arab action, with the aim of reaching such a joint strategy.


PFLP
UNITARY DEMOCRATIC
NON-SECTARIAN
palestine
PFLP

Al-Hakim speaks to Al-Qabas Kuwait (Newspaper)

George Habash, “Al-Hakim,” Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, did not remember me when I shook his hand in his office in Damascus. I reminded him that our acquaintance dates back to before the Israeli invasion in 1982. He welcomed me, but the lack of time prevented him from going back a little. He was eager, so he asked me about Al-Qabas International and its conditions, indicating his constant follow-up of it, then he sat on the sofa and ordered morning coffee.

These are the sacred constants that always shine in the mind of Al-Hakim and emerge from his lips with clear emotions. He always puts the Palestinian issue, in its essence, in the balance, and the balance now tilts in favor of the intifada, it is on and around the Palestinian issue. The uprising of the Palestinian people that most of this dialogue was focused [on], the text of which is presented below:

I have just come from Beirut, where the war in the Palestinian camps intersects with space and people, sending the smell of gunpowder to the noses and fear into the souls of thousands. I am also coming from Beirut, where the echoes of the intifada in the occupied territories knock on every door and impose themselves as a daily occurrence. Between these two cases, you find me confused as to the priority of the question: Should I ask you about the intifada or should I ask you about that devastating war in the camps?

The main aspect of the Palestinian national struggle at this moment is the intifada. Therefore, it is natural that the intifada is primarily the focus of thinking and the focus of effectiveness and activity, whether for us or for all national and progressive forces in the Arab world.

It is true that there is, at this particular moment, a very painful aspect to the Palestinian march, which is the Palestinian-on-Palestinian fighting in the Shatila camp and Burj al-Barajneh. But the main feature of this era in our history is the intifada.

This intifada is a big thing, and from our point of view it establishes a new phase in the Palestinian national struggle. It also establishes a new phase in the Arab liberation struggle. Therefore, my answer to your question is, let us begin with the intifada.

Suffering

There is a time factor. There is urgent talk about this factor influencing the intifada, and it is said that it is a war of exhaustion between the Palestinians and the occupation authorities. To what extent do you take this factor into account?

First, I would like to emphasize that careful contemplation and careful thinking about the intifada and the reasons that led to it clearly indicate that our Palestinian masses in the occupied homeland would not have risen up with such violence, such comprehensiveness, and such continuity, had it not been for the availability of two basic factors. The first factor is the extent of the suffering that the masses are experiencing. It results from the nature of the Zionist occupation of our occupied land, and by that I mean the confiscation of the land, settlement, theft of water, the complete destruction of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza to the Zionist economy, and the resulting life suffering that I cannot describe. In addition to political injustice, persecution, arrests, torture, and administrative imprisonment. All of this has brought our Palestinian masses in Palestine, occupied since 1967, to a psychological situation as if they were raising the slogan of freedom or death. Our masses are fed up with this occupation and have developed a strong belief that says there must be a struggle. You cannot imagine the strength flowing from this psychological state that our masses are experiencing. By the way, these words are what explain the characteristics of the intifada. This comprehensiveness is what makes this intifada neither a student intifada, nor an intifada of a specific organization. It is an intifada of all classes of the Palestinian people, an intifada of all Palestinian national forces, where all ideological movements contribute to the intifada, and all contribute to it. Generations of children, boys, youth, the elderly, and women. Have we

asked ourselves what explains the comprehensiveness of the intifada in this way? Have we asked ourselves what explains the continuation of the intifada? My answer is that what explains this is the extent of the suffering experienced by our masses and the resulting struggle, determination, and raising it with daily behavior as the slogan of life or death.

A second factor is added to this [first] factor, which is the subjective factor. In other words, if the conditions of occupation constitute the objective factor of the intifada, there is a subjective factor represented by the organized forces that constitute the vanguard of the intifada.

The size of these forces in terms of numbers, and their maturity resulting from the historical procession of the Palestinian national struggle, makes us reassured that the intifada will continue. Therefore, we mistake the state of anxiety experienced by some Palestinian leadership circles, which act politically on the basis that the intifada may end this month or the next. We say, therefore, that we must accelerate the political investment in this intifada so that we do not miss the opportunity. Naturally, I cannot fall into the theoretical and political mistake that says that the intifada will continue forever. The intifada is a phenomenon, and every phenomenon has a period of emergence, then a period of development, and then reaches its climax. But what determines our political investment in the intifada is the following question: Has the intifada reached its peak? The level that enables it to achieve the political slogan that it raised, the slogan of freedom and independence, the slogan of an independent Palestinian state? Or has it reached the level that enables it to achieve the national goals and demands that it raised in the second statement of the unified national leadership, as a step on the path to reaching the goal of freedom and independence?

We hope that what “Israel” says up to this moment will be carefully scrutinized. Israel is working to suppress the intifada. Since the beginning of the intifada, I can recall Rabin having made several statements, the last of which says that this intifada will be the last of the intifadas. In addition to that, he said that we have no choice but to suppress the intifada because its continuation threatens the Zionist entity. This is the Israeli position in

general, and despite the differences between the Israeli Likud and the Labor Party, there is an agreement between them to suppress the intifada. This is with regard to “Israel”, and here I do not belittle, but rather respect and applaud the voices that rise within “Israel” speaking about the Palestinian people and their inalienable national rights. But I regret to say that these voices constitute the secondary aspect within the Zionist entity and not the main aspect.

Then what does America say up to this moment?

Schultz's plan, until this moment, says no to the PLO, no to an independent Palestinian state, and the solution to the Palestinian issue comes through the Jordanian option. This means that we are going through, until this moment, a period that requires focusing, addressing, then undertaking the continuation of the Intifada and its escalation, and not on the wrong and hasty investment in the Intifada, the only result of which may be a negative impact on Palestinian national unity and on the Intifada itself.

The Wrong Investment in the Intifada is Rejected

Who proposes the wrong investment project for the intifada at this stage, and in what form does this issue arise?

So far, we have faced three attempts to exploit the intifada in a wrong and hasty manner. These attempts can only lead to negative results.

The first attempt was the day the issue of the government in exile was raised, and the first month had not passed since the intifada. We asked ourselves at that time about the political goal that the government in exile could achieve.

As we all know, the Palestine Liberation Organization holds popular and official Palestinian and Arab recognition, and international recognition, with the exception of “Israel” and the American administration. If the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the eyes of all these circles, then why do we propose a government in exile? What do we want from a government in exile? Are we not entitled to conclude that the

aim of this proposal is to circumvent the PLO, its charter, its transitory program, and the decisions of its national councils, especially the National Unified Council that was held in Algeria? The introduction of the slogan of the exile government created a shock in the Palestinian arena, and thank God we were able to besiege this proposal and stifle it.

The second attempt after that was the visit of Hanna Siniora and Fayez Abu Rahma to America and their meeting with Schultz. What we understood is that this meeting cannot take place except after obtaining the approval of some influential Palestinian forces. What was Schultz's goal from this meeting? The goal was to circumvent the unified national leadership of the intifada and try to divide the Palestinian ranks.

Doesn’t this constitute a hasty and wrong investment in the intifada?

The last attempt was this document released by Bassam Abu Sharif in his capacity as the media advisor to the Chairman of the PLO. This document constitutes a real danger to the course of the intifada, and I have read it. Isn't it painful, unfortunate, and shameful to talk about time rising? Are there voices inside Israel that say that the Zionist entity has turned into a Nazi entity? At a time when we demand that the world condemn Israel as an anti-peace force? This is not all, as the document focuses primarily on direct negotiations with Israel. It is true that it addresses the international conference, but the point of gravity in the document is the focus on direct negotiations. There is a big difference between focusing on the international conference through which bilateral and tripartite negotiations can take place and focusing on direct peace negotiations. Then there is another point regarding the memorandum.

Unified National Command

If you allow us, Hakim, we will return to the subject of the document later. We hope that we will return to the Intifada to ask you: To what extent the borders separate and the unified national leadership relates to the Palestinian political situation outside the occupied territories?

The unified national leadership in the occupied territories is an arm of the PLO, and any attempt to separate the unified national leadership from the PLO constitutes a major mistake and will result in failure. This does not prevent me from pointing out that this striking arm of the PLO at home expresses the PLO Charter, expresses its adherence to the transitory program, and expresses the decisions of the Palestinian National Council's much more than some opportunists and surrenderers do within the framework of the PLO.

This indicates concern for the unified national leadership in terms of what these movements, which I called opportunistic and submissive, might reflect on it.

These trends that I mentioned are the ones that are experiencing a state of anxiety. The fear that it will be surpassed by the unified national leadership that expresses, honestly and sincerely, every word of our transitory program and decisions.

Do you think that the Palestinian rift is at the factional level? Will the Palestinian Authority outside the occupied territories, of various shapes and types, continue to be isolated from influence from the unified national leadership?

If you mean the differences in viewpoints within the framework of the organizations that operate within the framework of the PLO, then my answer is that this will not lead to a rift. For example, for the Popular Front, it represents a certain point of view regarding the intifada, its prospects, and how its tactical and daily battles should be fought. But at a time when you find us determined to protect the intifada politically from any political breach or hasty and wrong political investment, you find us at the same time keen for our battles to be won within the legitimate frameworks of the PLO, and we are confident of that. For example, have you heard about the government in exile in recent weeks? I believe your answer is no.

Correct.

We eased the political battle related to the government in exile without exposing the Palestinian arena to any division, and based on this model, the intifada in the occupied territories is now a great support for the line, and I emphasize the national line.

Palestinian Progressive Nationalist

But if you mean the topic of organizations that are still outside the framework of the PLO, then my answer is that this is unfortunate, of course. We had hoped that it would be addressed quickly, but whoever knows the details of the current situation in the Palestinian arena at home knows that the forces are operating within the framework of the PLO. It is the foundation and leadership of the intifada, and therefore there is no fear that the existing differences abroad will reflect negatively on the intifada.

We realize that the enemy's bet is based on exploiting Palestinian differences. The enemy has failed in the policy of repression, arrests, and all other means. Hence, we find a new tone in the Israeli plan that focuses on any differences in the Palestinian arena with the aim of exploiting them negatively to weaken the intifada at home. These are merely the wishes of the enemy, and what I know of him and according to my information, he confirms that the unified leadership of the the intifada, despite the gaps that naturally exist, constitutes a cohesive leadership that feels its historical responsibility, and is aware of all the objective and drawn-up plans to strike the intifada, whether politically or oppressively.

Freedom, Independence, or Death

Does the intifada intend to achieve some political issues in a phased manner, or does everything depend on the final results?

The intifada and its leadership defined the political slogan regulating all tactics, which is the slogan of freedom and independence, but it was not satisfied with that. It added to this slogan regulating the struggle, a group of democratic slogans of demands, but it stressed that these demands and

tactical slogans must be achieved with our eyes fixed on the slogan of freedom, independence, and achieving an independent Palestinian state.

These slogans were specified in one of the statements of the Unified National Command with fourteen demands, including: stopping the confiscation of land, stopping settlement, removing the army from residential areas, canceling taxes or canceling a certain type of taxes, and canceling the iron fist policy. The leadership of the intifada is keen for these demands to be met, within the framework of the trend towards achieving freedom, independence, and a Palestinian state. In one of the statements of the Unified Command, a topic was specified for the struggle to remove the Israeli occupation from the areas occupied since 1967 and for the United Nations to come to replace the occupation forces so that municipal elections can be held and an international conference can be held.

Arab Incubator

In its current political and field journey, do you see that the Intifada is capable of achieving its great political slogan, or does the matter require quantitative and qualitative development?

This matter requires work on three fronts.

First: Continuing the intifada and its escalation.

Second: Creating the Arab national incubator.

Third: The international circle and the necessity of investing in the intifada to put the United Nations before its duties towards the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent national state, and so that we can create the international force that puts an end to Israel’s stubbornness and arrogance.

This is out of ambition... I don't agree with that. Regarding the intifada, its development and escalation...

It is ambitious in relation to what I mentioned about the Arab incubator and international pressure.

I will mention everything. Is the development and escalation of the intifada an imaginary and ideal proposition, or is this the universal thing? The answer is that this is what everyone on the ground feels. Now, the intifada is continuing and escalating. Now, there is dual authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There is the occupation authority, and it is true that we did not completely eliminate it, but you see the beginning of the crystallization of the authority of the people. We still have opportunities and plans to escalate the intifada, and do not forget that the Zionist entity has its hand over its heart for fear of the continuation of the intifada and its transmission to the Palestinians of 1948, or its transmission to the Jewish democratic forces that have become living in a state of tension as a result of Israel's transformation into fascism.

On the Arab level, I agree with you that the weak point is in this area, but the intifada is still in its infancy. Didn't the intifada, at its beginning, have an impact on Palestinian-Syrian relations?

To some extent, yes, but the intifada continues.

Restoring the alliance between the PLO in Syria in addition to the efforts of the Libyan and Algerian leadership and all the progressive Arab national forces, all of this will provide, with time, a certain level of Arab solidarity with the intifada with what we called the Arab incubator, in the event that the intifada continues and its impact on the Arab reality begins. I forgot to mention that the intifada left its effects on the official Arab reality (referring thus to the recent Algiers conference and the nature of the decisions that were taken).

So, if the intifada escalates and continues and affects the official and popular Arab situation, will the USA remain in the same position? Then don't you feel that the ability of the Soviets, our strategic friends, to act in the international framework will be strengthened and will increase?

The American Position

Are you betting on a change in the American position?

The American position will force him to deal with the new realities. It is true that until now there has been no change in this regard, but will this situation continue forever? My answer is no, not even Israel itself, which said at the beginning of the intifada that it could not think of any political solution. Political talk is only after the end of the suppression of the intifada. Even "Israel" recently had to have its Defense Minister meet with some Palestinian figures. Of course, these figures are of the worn-out type, but the continuation of the intifada will force Rabin to meet with other types of Palestinian figures. The intifada will continue until Israel finds itself forced to meet with Palestinian national figures, is forced to recognize the PLO, and recognizes the national rights of the Palestinian people.

What about America if it feels that the Arab regimes are changing their position? What do you think of the American position if the intifada continues and generates Arab public opinion that pressures all regimes to take minimum measures against the American administration?

Everything is changeable, everything is transformable.

What is important is our will, our struggle, investing in the energies of our masses, and absorbing the lessons of the intifada.

The intifada is to defeat once and for all some concepts in the Palestinian-Arab arena, and to clearly prove some concepts. Our masses at home have erased some concepts, and the intifada is still in its infancy.

Please remember that the entire approach of the Popular Front is based on the fact that the intifada is [only] at its beginning.

Civil Disobedience

The intifada began with demonstrations, then with stones, then Molotov cocktails, then fires. Then what?

National disobedience. In the statements of the national leadership, there is an indication and emphasis on the necessity of following the path of civil disobedience.

Now, what does civil disobedience mean? Are we going down this path? Will this constitute a qualitative leap in the path of the intifada? Is there a Palestinian consensus on taking the path of national disobedience?

Regarding the meaning, national disobedience is that despite the presence of the occupation forces, and despite the presence of the local authority that the occupation created, and which the occupation can continue to create, despite all of this, the masses of the intifada create their own national authority that becomes the truth and the masses rally around it and fulfill their plans. It is the authority that works to achieve the goals of the masses through democratic interaction with them.

Naturally, in order not to have some illusions that might confuse our masses, we should not imagine that civil disobedience will mean complete and final victory over the occupying authority, but rather it means that the authority of the people becomes the main aspect in occupied Palestine.

We all know the difficulty that hinders the complete evacuation of the occupation, and as long as the occupation exists, it will be able to find a minimum number of agents, a minimum number of people who will cooperate with it. But, on the other hand, it is legitimate for us to aspire, and we can do so, to reach a stage in which the authority of the people becomes the main aspect.

Closing Bridges and Mass Deportations

How will Israel respond, and do you believe that the occupation authorities have exhausted the means to combat the intifada?

I can't say that. But I would like to stress that our Palestinian and Arab masses are still at the beginning of mobilizing their energies. We must admit that the enemy possesses weapons, and it is not a secret that I am putting forward what is on the enemy’s mind about using new weapons to

suppress the intifada. This is not a secret because some of those responsible for such weapons, as they are the Israelis, speak about whether or not they were playing with creating the West Bank and Gaza, in the sense of cutting [us] off. There is no connection between the West Bank and Gaza and between the whole world. Their main weapon is closing bridges, and the extremists threaten to resort to a policy of collective deportation.

Through massacres?

Yes. We are well aware of this, but on the other hand, we realize that revolution is a science that requires a revolutionary scientific tactic that is aware of the danger of conspiracy and adolescence, and aware of the necessity of taking objective circumstances into consideration, whether on the Arab, international or local levels. Despite all this, I express my true belief in the capabilities of our masses to achieve their slogans at home.

The Camp War is a Limited Phenomenon

We move to the situation on the Lebanese scene, the most prominent characteristic of which is the camp war. There are those who say that this war is on its way to the Palestinian civil war.

Firstly, the Palestinian revolution is not limited to the Lebanese arena, although this opportunity constitutes a basic pillar of the Palestinian revolution, it is one of the pillars of the revolution. The basic pillar is occupied Palestine. Therefore, when the question is that what is happening now in Lebanon is the beginning of a Palestinian civil war, in this case, I do not agree with your opinion, because you do not find such a war between the Palestinian communities in the occupied territories or in Jordan. This phenomenon is confined, and will remain confined, to the Lebanese arena.

Liquidation of the Palestinian Gun

If you allow me to specify the question more, is there a fear that the fighting in the camps will turn into a civil war, meaning that it will drag the rest of the Palestinian factions into this fighting, or will it be directly reflected on the popular base?

Of course, the question is understandable for the following reason: We all know that there is a hostile plan to attack the entire Palestinian presence in Lebanon, especially the Palestinian gun in Lebanon. The stages of this plan are known: the invasion, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the first and second camp wars, and the camp war now. Therefore, the forces that want to end the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, or that want to reduce this presence, and thus end the Palestinian gun in Lebanon, will continue to operate. They operate on a regular basis, and it is natural that these forces find, in the ongoing Palestinian fighting, their rare opportunity to reach their goals. Moreover, such a ban that you refer to should not be taken lightly or overlooked, but there are forces that realize the danger of the plan and are working to thwart it. Therefore, the Lebanese arena will live in a state of conflict over this particular point, and for our part, we will not be drawn into the fighting in any way.

We not only condemn this Palestinian-on-Palestinian fighting, but describe it as a crime, and a crime in light of the intifada in particular. There are many Palestinian forces that take such a position, and we are now working for the two warring parties to realize this fact, the fact that their fighting will result in the implementation of anti-Palestinian gun plans. We are working to seek the assistance of all Arab and international forces that realize the seriousness of what is happening in the camps with regard to the Palestinian gun, the Palestinian presence, and the intifada. We hope that we will succeed in this, and we are working for our masses in Lebanon to become a pressing force to stop the fighting. There is no Palestinian public opinion that views the fighting as a major crime.

Weapon of Defamation

It seems that all pressures have not succeeded. What are the practical means to stop the fighting?

Firstly, saying that all the efforts made so far have been of no benefit does not mean that there will be no continuation. Focus now on the mass movement that makes the combatants aware of the extent of the danger

they are committing against the intifada and against the Palestinian revolutionaries, in particular the main party that bears responsibility for the bombing and displacement, and by that I mean Fatah - the transitory leadership. As a specific action, we are working hard to stop the fighting, and I hope that we will soon be able to use the weapon of defamation against the party that violates the latest ceasefire agreement. After we benefit from the cessation of fighting, we will bring in Palestinian security forces from the seven organizations that did not participate in the fighting to form a barrier that prevents a return to fighting.

Red Line

One of the Palestinian officials in Beirut told me that the ongoing fighting had not reached the red line, and that if the situation reached this stage, the seven factions would have to intervene practically to stop the fighting. What do you think?

We do not want to think about reaching the red line.

My information is that in the last meeting between [US Secretary of State] Schultz and Amine Gemayel in Cyprus, three topics were discussed. The first of which was the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. I hope that you inform the responsible Palestinian, whom you spoke about, so that he does not work to reach the red line and exerts his efforts to stop the fighting.

[War of the] Camps are the Key to the Solution

There are those who say that the ongoing camp war is one of the keys to the solution in Lebanon. What do you think?

Yes, this is true, and whether this fighting occurred with this aim or not, it is natural that it was exploited to implement the many plans that were drawn up on the basis of Palestinian disarmament as a prelude to a solution to the Lebanese issue.

Syrian-Palestinian Relations

What is the fate of the Syrian-Palestinian dialogue that took place to normalize relations between the two parties? Has the dialogue stopped? Did it not stop? What are the new developments?

The dialogue did not stop, and a meeting took place at the last summit between the Syrian leadership and the Palestinian leadership. In this meeting, it was agreed to continue the dialogue, and it was also agreed that it would be through bilateral contacts. A date is being set as soon as possible that suits both parties for a delegation from the PLO to go to Damascus to continue the dialogue.

I want to emphasize that the beginning of the resolution of this problem, the knot of Syrian-Palestinian relations, was a result of the intifada, and it represents a major achievement for the intifada itself. Anyone who is familiar with the extent of the complications that stand in the way of normalizing and strengthening Syrian-Palestinian relations knows very well that it would not have been possible to begin normalizing relations, had it not been for the intifada and its effects on the Arab arena. It is true that the martyrdom of Abu Jihad and the presence of his family in Damascus, and it is true that among the factors that played a role in receiving the martyr's body in Damascus, were Arab chivalry and Arab gallantry. It is also true that both Syrian parties and the Palestinians found, in the martyrdom of Abu Jihad, an opportunity for normalization of relations between the PLO and Syria.

We now know that normalizing and then strengthening relations constitutes an interest, Syrian and Palestinian, and any responsible, accurate and scientific thinking by the Palestinian leadership leads it to conclude that strengthening its relationship with Syria constitutes a need for it and for the intifada to achieve the political goal of the intifada. As for the Syrian leadership, any serious thought about standing up in the face of the Israeli and imperialist plans being hatched against it must lead it to think that its alliance with the PLO constitutes a necessary need for Syria itself. Hence, despite the obstacles that hinder strengthening the relationship, we are

aware of these obstacles and do not underestimate it, we believe that things will move in the direction of strengthening relations.

We have mentioned the topic of the Arab past of the intifada, and here the serious thinking about changing the official Arab situation begins with strengthening the relationship between Syria and the PLO. This is what prompted us, after the establishment of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria, to consider that strengthening the relationship between Syria and the PLO now constitutes the link for us of centralization on the Arab level. Some may have ridiculed this proposal at the time due to their knowledge of the great existing doctrines, but the common interest of both parties requires and will push towards strengthening relations.

Arafat's Visit to Damascus

Are there joint committees to crystallize what was agreed upon in Algeria?

The thing that was agreed upon in the Algeria meeting was to visit the brother Yasser Arafat, [he's] heading a delegation from the Damascus PLO.

Is this timed?

The expression [that was] used is "as soon as suits both parties."

Is there a political situation that should accompany this visit?

At the summit, the general political climate contributed to the strengthening of relations, as there was common agreement on the seriousness of the projects. The proposed American policy, the necessity of standing up to it, and an agreement to support and protect the intifada, these points of agreement herald the possibility of strengthening relations. There is still an obstacle to the relationship with Egypt, an obstacle to the position regarding contacts with the so-called democratic forces in "Israel", and the obstacle to Palestinian national unity, that is, the issue of the factions that did not join the PLO, and of course there is the issue of Lebanon.

I want to say that our expectations, as the Popular Front, are that things will move towards the strengthening of relations.

Abu Sharif Document

Let us return now to what I mentioned about the Bassam Abu Sharif document. I said that the fear of this document is our focus on direct dialogue with Israel and not on the international conference. Can we read in this statement that there is a possibility for discussion? Or amend this document?

Firstly, this is not my only objection to the document. There are a group of basic objections. We begin first with the regulatory objection, as no one can be convinced that the document was completed in isolation from Yasser Arafat. Here we ask: Why does the head of the PLO act in this way? Why did he not present the idea to the Executive Committee? Why did he not bring it up with the Palestinian leadership? The second issue is that the document indicates that this solution is the final solution to the Middle East crisis. Who said that the PLO Charter, that is, the transitory program, or the decisions of the National Council say, or accept the establishment of recognition of the existence of the Zionist entity? I am a member of the National Council, I know the charter, the transitory program, and the decisions of the last National Council well. I do not recall that one day the Palestinian National Council would take a decision to finally recognize and consecrate the existence of Israel.

Our goal in the international conference is to extract a sovereign Palestinian national state, a sovereign state that has the right to first recognize and recognize any other state. Basically, the program for the Palestinian state was called the transitory program of the PLO. So how can any person allow himself to write a memorandum or an article in which he refers to the final consecration of the Zionist presence on Palestinian land? Then, in the event of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, what about the right of return? The transitory program calls for the right of return, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian

state. Have we abandoned this program? Everyone must know that a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip solves the problem of a third of our Palestinian people. I am from the city of Lydd, and my fighting and struggle cannot stop unless I return to the city of Lydd. Ok, Reagan is fighting for the right of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel. Don't I have the right to fight to return to my homeland, and what applies to me also applies to 60% of the Palestinian masses in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan? Is it appropriate to pursue tactics that would inflame Palestinian-on-Palestinian differences? Do they want me to incite 60% of the Palestinian people that this issue does not solve the problem, and therefore let us tell them, "Come, let us wage a battle against the owners of this danger?"

Hence, I hope that it becomes clear to those who submitted this memorandum to me. Realizing the danger of isolation. Realizing the danger of violating the political decisions we reach.

Finally, we ask ourselves the following question: Will this tactical cleverness lead to results? Is this the time to make more concessions? We are now at a stage in which the international conference has not yet begun. They want us to take off the jacket before the international conference. They are not satisfied with the jacket. They want pants. They are not satisfied with pants. They want underwear. At the international conference they want us naked!

End of Interview

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